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MADISON‘S FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE: 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Charles M. Yablon 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) has created a new wave of 
interest in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its apparent contradic-
tions. Important recent scholarship has shown that American lawyers in 
the eighteenth century often viewed the term “full faith and credit” as 
referring to an evidentiary rule. This interpretation ameliorates, but 
does not actually resolve, the apparent conflict between the first sen-
tence of the Clause, which seems to create a mandatory rule of sister 
state deference, and the second sentence of the Clause, which seems to 
give Congress plenary power to abrogate that rule. Rather than seek a 
chimerical general understanding of the Clause, this Article focuses on 
James Madison to provide a new and strikingly different historical ac-
count of the creation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It shows how 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause was part of a broader plan by Madi-
son and others to curb the ability of states to take acts that were harm-
ful to one another and to the nation, particularly those which, by inter-
fering with vested contract and property rights, jeopardized the 
country’s economic well-being. Madison purposely sought a Clause that 
would embody a vague but dynamic deference obligation that could be 
increased by Congress over time. 
Madison’s actions and writings regarding the Full Faith and Cre-
dit Clause strongly suggest that he would have considered congression-
al actions to weaken or abrogate existing deference obligations not just 
unwise and unjust, but unconstitutional. Unlike powers which appro-
priately belonged to the federal legislature irrespective of how they 
were exercised, Madison’s justification for the powers granted under 
the second sentence of the Clause was based on how Madison expected 
those powers to be used, namely, to “provide for the harmony and 
proper intercourse among the states.” What emerges from this analysis 
 
   Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I would like 
to thank my colleague Ed Stein for his insights and helpful suggestions with respect to earlier 
drafts of this Article, and Aaron Gaynor for exemplary research assistance. 
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is a picture of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that has significant si-
milarities to the “one way ratchet” interpretation which has been used 
to argue that the DOMA is unconstitutional, but one in which the pre-
sumed constraints on congressional action are the product of national 
interest, political virtue, and natural law as well as the language of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause1 is the only part of the United 
States Constitution that appears, at least to modern eyes, to contain a 
contradiction. The first sentence consists of an unconditional mandate 
that: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. 
Yet the second and final sentence, the so-called ―Effects Clause,‖ 
appears to grant plenary power to Congress to prescribe what effects, if 
any, the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of one state will have in 
the others: 
And Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof. 
It would appear that any coherent interpretation of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause must privilege one of these sentences over the other, 
and will therefore require a substantial departure from the actual text. 
The apparent inconsistency in the language of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause becomes a concrete legal issue, however, only if Con-
gress chooses to pass a law that appears to violate the mandate of the 
first sentence of the Clause. Congress arguably did that in 1996 with the 
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),2 which has created a 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The phrase ―full faith and credit‖ was taken verbatim (but only 
after considerable debate among the founders) from a very similar clause in the Articles of Con-
federation, whose drafters may have been the first to use it. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 488–89 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 2 Farrand]. The derivation of 
the phrase in the Articles is uncertain and has been the subject of much recent historical research. 
See, e.g., David Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1607 
(2009); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 
1217–22 (2009). 
 2 1 U.S.C § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). DOMA seeks to relieve states of any obli-
gation to give legal effect to same-sex marriages that have been recognized under the laws of oth-
er states. The recent decisions and legislative acts legalizing same-sex marriage in New York, 
Maine, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, Massachusetts and other states make it very likely that 
DOMA will increasingly be invoked in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage to avoid 
giving legal effect to such marriages in states that now permit them. See A.B. 8354, 234th Leg., 
2011-2012 Sess. (N.Y. 2011); S.B. 115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt. 2009) (legislation lega-
lizing same-sex marriage); L.D. 1020, 124th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2009) (legislation legalized 
same-sex marriage, but was overturned by a proposition the same year); H.B. 436, 161st Leg., 1st 
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new wave of interest in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its apparent 
contradictions. Some important recent scholarship has sought to interp-
ret the clause through historical inquiries into the meaning of the term 
―full faith and credit‖ in England and the United States in the eighteenth 
century and more generally into the conflict of law rules that existed at 
that time.3 This work has shown that the term ―full faith and credit‖ was 
 
Sess. (N.H. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that 
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples is unconstitutional); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2009) (holding statute limiting marriage to heterosexual couples violative of equal protec-
tion); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding no ―consti-
tutionality adequate reason‖ for denying right to gay marriage). California‘s back-and-forth 
stance on same-sex marriage raises unique DOMA issues. Recently, a federal district court over-
turned California‘s ban on same-sex marriage (enacted by referendum); the referendum had over-
turned an act of the state legislature legalizing same-sex marriage. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The status of same-sex couples married in California be-
fore the ban remains unclear. Additionally, the legalization of same-sex marriage in the District of 
Columbia raises unique DOMA issues. It is not a state, and states‘ full faith obligations to it are 
unclear. See D.C. CODE § 46–401 (2010). 
  The Department of Justice‘s recent decision not to defend the constitutionality of DOMA 
relates only to Section 3 of that statute, which defines marriage, for federal law purposes, as ―only 
a legal union between one man and one woman,‖ which the Attorney General found violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Att‘y Gen., to John 
Boehner, U.S. Speaker of the House (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with author). The Department of 
Justice did not discuss Section 2 of DOMA, which relieves states of any obligation to recognize 
same-sex marriages in other states and which arguably rests on an independent constitutional ba-
sis, the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. As more married same-sex 
couples seek to assert their rights in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, we can ex-
pect more litigation invoking Section 2 of DOMA and challenging its constitutionality. That con-
stitutional issue will turn on precisely the same interpretative question about the meaning of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause described at the beginning of this piece. 
 3 Historical articles dealing with the Full Faith and Credit Clause tend to appear when the 
Clause becomes involved in contemporary constitutional issues. Kurt Nadelmann‘s exhaustive 
historical inquiry was the last of a number of historical pieces generated by contemporary issues 
concerning the effect of the Clause on out of state application of workman‘s compensation laws. 
See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-
Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 75 (1957). Ralph Whitten has produced even more 
exhaustive historical analyses of the Clause, first in connection with contemporary debates about 
the constitutional limitations on state assertion of territorial jurisdiction, Ralph U. Whitten, The 
Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamina-
tion of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
499 (1980) [hereinafter Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction], and later offered a revised and ex-
panded version of that analysis in response to the controversy following the passage of DOMA, 
Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the De-
fense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 257 (1998) (first sentence of the Clause 
―originally understood as a narrow evidentiary command‖) [hereinafter Whitten, FF&C and 
DOMA]. Douglas Laycock‘s discussion of the historical origins of the clause was part of a broad-
er argument concerning constitutional limits on choice of law rules. Douglas Laycock, Equal Cit-
izens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). Daniel A. Crane also deals with these historical questions in connec-
tion with the DOMA controversy concluding that the first sentence was ―a default provision in 
the absence of more specific congressional legislation.‖ Daniel A. Crane, The Original Under-
standing of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV, Section 1 and Implications for the Defense of Mar-
riage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 335 (1998) [hereinafter Crane, Original Understanding]. 
More recently, Steven Sachs has shown that the early Congress did not always consider the first 
YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC 9/9/2011  6:08 PM 
128 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 33:1 
not understood to be nearly as sweeping as it now appears, but was of-
ten viewed by American lawyers in the late eighteenth century as an 
evidentiary rule, requiring only that courts take cognizance of judg-
ments validly issued by other states and treat them as prima facie evi-
dence of the underlying claim.4 It did not necessarily require that such 
judgments be treated as conclusively determining the pending dispute.5 
If this meaning is applied to the first sentence of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, the apparent conflict is ameliorated, although not actually 
resolved.6 The self-executing mandate of the first sentence is reduced to 
a narrow evidentiary rule, leaving an untrammeled Congress free, under 
 
sentence to be self-executing and that it was often understood as part of an evidentiary frame-
work.‖ Sachs, supra note 1, at 1201. Finally, in an important recent article in the Yale Law Jour-
nal, David Engdahl provides additional support for an evidentiary interpretation of the term ―full 
faith and credit‖ in sources prior to the Constitution, which he couples with a reading of the con-
stitutional clause which leaves the question of the effect of sister state judgments, ―dependent 
entirely on Congress‘s discretion.‖ Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1658. This article is, in large meas-
ure, a response to the articles by Professors Whitten, Engdahl, and Sachs. 
 4 See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1655; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1206; Whitten, FF&C and 
DOMA, supra note 3, at 257. 
 5 In theory, one can distinguish between a pure evidentiary rule, which deals only with pro-
cedures for authenticating and proving the existence and content of a foreign judgment or other 
official act without specifying its effect, and rules which set forth the effect of such judgments, 
once proved. Professor Sachs most clearly takes this minimalist view of the first sentence of the 
constitutional clause as well as the Articles‘ clause, arguing that in their original meaning, both 
dealt only with ―authentication‖ issues. Sachs, supra note 1, at 1226, 1230. Whitten takes almost 
the same position, but believes that the clauses required not only that the sister state judgments be 
authenticated but that they be admitted into evidence. Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, 
at 269–71; Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 546–47. Both Whitten and Sachs 
believe that courts would use other legal principles, namely those of the law of nations, to deter-
mine the effect such evidence would have. See Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 284; 
Sachs, supra note 1, at 1213, 1225. They agree that the usual result, based on English precedents 
of the time, was to treat the foreign judgment as prima facie evidence of the claim. See Sachs, 
supra note 1, at 1213; Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 284. Engdahl appears to en-
dorse a somewhat more expansive interpretation. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1610. Beginning 
with the English case law, which not only recognized foreign judgments, but also generally 
treated them as at least prima facie evidence of the underlying claim, Engdahl argues that this 
―familiar prima facie evidence rule‖ was incorporated into the meaning of the term ―full faith and 
credit‖ in the Articles‘ clause. Id. at 1611. All these writers contrast this with a rule of ―substan-
tive deference‖ that required the courts of one state to treat the judgments of another as conclu-
sive on the underlying claim, much as they would an authenticated prior judgment of their own 
state courts. See id.; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1206; Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 
273–74. Whitten, Engdahl, and Sachs all recognize that rules of substantive deference were some-
times applied under the law of nations (as in admiralty cases) but do not believe that it was part of 
the meaning of either the Articles‘ clause or the first sentence of the constitutional Clause. See 
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1593; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1215; Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra 
note 3, at 269–70. As we can see from this brief discussion, however, not only is there uncertainty 
over the meaning of the Clause, but it is closely related to uncertainty over the extent, if any, to 
which the Clause was intended to embody principles of deference taken from the law of nations, 
as well as uncertainty over the precise content of that law. 
 6 The question would still remain whether Congress had constitutional power to abrogate or 
substantially modify the evidentiary or prima facie evidence rules presumably embodied in the 
first sentence of the Clause. 
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the second sentence, to legislate substantially regarding the effects of 
such judgments.7 
The historical research that underlies these arguments is impres-
sive, and the authors have provided much important new information 
about procedural and evidentiary practice in eighteenth-century England 
and America. Yet there are serious methodological flaws in their at-
tempts to provide an accurate historical account of the creation and 
meaning of the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause. First, it is 
extremely doubtful that there is any single right answer to their narrow-
ly focused search for the meaning of the term ―full faith and credit‖ as 
used in the Constitution or the authorities that preceded it. These scho-
lars‘ careful examination of sources has revealed substantial inconsis-
tencies in the use of the term in English practice,8 in the jurisprudence 
of the individual states,9 and in cases decided under the Articles of Con-
federation.10 In short, what these scholars have really shown is that there 
was no consensus at the time of the Founding concerning the legal 
meaning of the term. Rather, as commentators at the time acknowl-
edged, the language itself was highly disputable and ―indeterminate.‖11 
In light of that ambiguity, modern attempts to establish an accurate 
―original meaning‖ for the phrase as a legal term of art seems a quixotic 
one. 
Moreover, this narrow focus on doctrinal conflicts regarding the 
precise legal meaning of the full faith and credit language of the Clause 
fails to recognize the broader constitutional issues that were foremost in 
the minds of the Founders as they debated the appropriate scope and 
 
 7 Nadelmann concluded that the first sentence of the Clause created a self-implementing 
command on each state to enforce applicable statutes of sister states in the absence of conflicting 
state policies, and that the second sentence of the Clause conferred power on Congress to act 
when such conflicts arose. Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 79–80. Whitten argued, in both his ar-
ticles, that the first sentence of the clause was, in the absence of congressional action, merely an 
evidence rule requiring that states admit and recognize authenticated versions of state records as 
proof of the laws and judgments of sister states. Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 
263–64; Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 545–46. Laycock provides the strong-
est version of the first sentence of the Clause, arguing that it is a self effectuating rule that re-
quires states to enforce sister state laws in accordance with common law choice of law rules, 
which can be altered by congressional action. Laycock, supra note 3, at 298–301. Crane, while 
acknowledging ―some tension‖ between the first and second sentence of the Clause, concludes 
that the first sentence was merely a default provision until Congress provided more specific rules. 
Crane, Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 323–24. 
 8 After examining the eighteenth-century English law on recognition of foreign judgments, 
scholars have concluded that ―full faith and credit‖ and similar terms ―appear to have been evi-
dentiary terms of art that could be used to cover a range of effects and weights.‖ Whitten, State-
Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 520. 
 9 While a number of the states had statutes which can be plausibly read to embody versions 
of the prima facie rule, Massachusetts passed a statute in 1774 which appeared to prescribe a con-
clusive effect for sister state judgments. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 531. 
 10 See infra notes 64–88 and accompanying text. 
 11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); see also discussion infra Part I.B. 
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operation of the full faith and credit obligation. As we will see, the so-
phisticated lawyers among the Founders were well aware that the lan-
guage they were adopting in the first sentence of the Clause was some-
what vague and had been subject to differing interpretations, but were 
not overly concerned about ambiguities in the prior law involving sister-
state deference.12 Rather, the concerns of Madison and his allies con-
cerning full faith and credit were more closely tied to the broader issues 
facing the Convention, concerns about the relative powers of the federal 
and state governments, about the need to avoid ―trespasses‖ of the pow-
ers of one state on those of others, and the need to deter interference by 
misguided state legislators on minority interests and vested property 
rights, particularly those of out-of-state creditors.13 It was these con-
cerns that shaped the debate about the Full Faith and Credit Clause and 
determined its final form. 
This Article seeks to provide a broader, more historically accurate 
account of the creation and original conception of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. Rather than seek a chimerical general understanding of 
the Clause, it seeks to ascertain how the Clause was understood at the 
time of the Founding by one particularly powerful intellect—that of 
James Madison.14 Madison is generally viewed as the ―Father of the 
Constitution,‖15 the founder who came to Philadelphia having done the 
most profound thinking about republican forms of government and the 
 
 12 See discussion infra Part II.B. There is little doubt that contemporary lawyers recognized 
the indeterminacy of the full faith obligation set forth in the Articles of Confederation, which can 
be seen in contemporary case law, in statements concerning the meaning of that sentence during 
the Constitutional Convention, and perhaps most clearly, in the comments of James Madison in 
Federalist 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). Closely related to this is an exaggera-
tion by modern scholars of the importance of this interpretative dispute to lawyers of the period, 
and particularly to the Founders. The primary practical effect of the distinction between an evi-
dentiary and substantive rule was whether merits-based defenses could be asserted. The distinc-
tion was of little practical significance in the many suits decided on default judgment, see Debo-
rah Rosen, The Supreme Court of Judicature of Colonial New York: Civil Practice in Transition, 
1691–1760, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 213, 230 (1987) (noting very high default rates in colonial 
courts) [hereinafter Rosen, Supreme Court], or in suits against impecunious debtors with no subs-
tantive defenses to assert, and again, Madison tells us as much in Federalist 42. THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 42 (James Madison). Madison‘s disparagement of interpretive disputes in matters of technic-
al law was very much in keeping with the general attitude towards law in the post-revolutionary 
period, where attempts to displace ―archaic English laws and legal technicalities‖ with simplified 
codes, later gave rise to calls for more discretionary application of ―general rules of equity.‖ Gor-
don S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More 
Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 791–92 (1999) [hereinafter Wood, Judicial Review 
Revisited]. 
 13 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 14 Doing so will, of course, also give us substantial insight into the views of many of those 
who shared Madison‘s perspective on the Constitution. 
 15 LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 76 (1995); IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 155 (1950) [hereinafter BRANT, FATHER]. 
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weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation.16 He had the most cohe-
rent, innovative, and comprehensive plans for reshaping the American 
republic.17 Yet he was also a practical politician, skilled in the uses of 
ambiguity, compromise, and countervailing forces to achieve his broad-
er political goals.18 He was also a member of the Virginia planter aristo-
cracy,19 seriously concerned about the dangers posed by perceived ex-
cesses of democratic governance to vested property rights.20 
It was Madison who proposed the precise language that became the 
actual text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.21 He played a prominent 
role in the debates that led to its passage, and in drafting the final lan-
guage of the Clause. It was Madison who inserted mandatory rather 
than hortatory language into the first sentence of the Clause (changing 
―ought‖ to ―shall‖).22 Yet it was also Madison who argued, in Federalist 
No. 42, that it was the grant of broad powers to Congress in the second 
sentence of the Clause that rendered it ―an evident and valuable im-
provement‖ over the Articles of Confederation.23 
In recent years there has been a small boom in interest among his-
torians and legal scholars in the political thought of James Madison and 
the role it played in the creation of the Constitution.24 There have also 
 
 16 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the U. States (Apr. 1787), in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) [hereinafter 
Madison, Vices]; see also BANNING, supra note 15, at 115; WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE 
BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 22 (1992); GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 472 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, THE 
CREATION]. 
 17 JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 49 
(3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter RAKOVE, MADISON]. 
 18 See BANNING, supra note 15, at 88–91; RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A 
BIOGRAPHY 94–95, 112, 114–15 (spec. ed. 2003); Randall Strahan, Personal Motives, Constitu-
tional Forms and the Public Good: Madison on Political Leadership, in JAMES MADISON: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 67 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003). 
 19 KETCHAM, supra note 18, at 3–7; RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 1. 
 20 RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 54, 59; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS 
LEGACY 25–38 (1990) [hereinafter NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY]. 
 21 That is, after the language of the Clause had been substantially approved, Madison pro-
posed the final substantive changes in the text, changing ―ought‖ in the first sentence to ―shall‖ 
and ―should‖ in the second sentence to ―may,‖ changes that were approved unanimously. 2 Far-
rand, supra note 1, at 484–85; see also notes 222–225 infra and accompanying text. 
 22 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489. 
 23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 24 This recent scholarship has provided new insights into Madison‘s political thought at the 
time of the founding, his practical political concerns and the compromises he was willing or felt 
compelled to make to keep the project going. Whereas earlier scholars saw Madison at the time of 
the Founding as an ardent federalist with little regard for the preservation of state‘s rights who 
later changed into a Jeffersonian republican, see generally BRANT, FATHER, supra note 15, at 11–
13, 351; WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 16, at 525, the newer scholarship stresses the conti-
nuities in Madisonian thought and views him as always trying to steer a middle path between the 
excesses of state and federal power. See generally BANNING, supra note 15; RAKOVE, MADISON, 
supra note 17, at 57. This new scholarship emphasizes Madison‘s pragmatism, as well as the ten-
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been important new studies into the extent to which Madison and other 
founders anticipated judicial review, particularly regarding the constitu-
tionality of federal legislation.25 
This Article seeks to use this work to provide a new and strikingly 
different historical account of the creation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. It shows that the fundamental debate over the Clause at the 
Constitutional Convention was not between advocates of evidentiary 
and substantive interpretations of the full faith obligation—as most prior 
scholarship has assumed—but between advocates of a substantive but 
static and limited rule of deference clearly set out in the constitutional 
text, and those, like Madison, who favored a vaguer but more dynamic 
rule of substantive deference that could be enhanced by Congressional 
enactment and that could lead to a relatively unified litigation system in 
which judgments rendered in one state could be executed in the courts 
of another. 
It also shows how the Full Faith and Credit Clause was part of a 
broader plan by Madison and others to curb the ability of states to take 
acts that were harmful to one another or to the nation as a whole, partic-
ularly those which, by interfering with vested contract and property 
rights, jeopardized the country‘s economic well-being. To this end, the 
full faith obligation was expanded to include deference to legislative 
acts of sister states, a deference that was expected to apply only to that 
relatively narrow class of state laws that created, defined, or altered 
property or contract rights that might be enforced in other states, includ-
ing bankruptcy laws of general import. Equally importantly, the federal 
legislature was given broad power to define and develop these obliga-
tions. Madison hoped and expected that Congress would act as a ―disin-
terested and dispassionate umpire‖26 among the states, using the full 
faith and credit obligation to help create a coordinated judicial system 
for the protection and enforcement of creditors‘ rights.27 
 
tativeness and uncertainty with which Madison approached the task of Constitution drafting, his 
recognition that the political system the Founders were seeking to create had no real precedents in 
history and that its operation in practice was uncertain and unknowable. It also recognizes the 
important role that political ―virtue‖ played in Madison‘s thought, his belief that the constitutional 
system being created could only survive if the powers of the federal government were wielded by 
men of vision and honor, who could avoid the pitfalls of faction and interstate rivalry which he 
saw as so endemic and destructive in the Articles of Confederation period. Id. at 51; David Brian 
Robertson, Constituting a National Interest: Madison Against the States’ Autonomy, in JAMES 
MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 200–01 (Samuel Kernell 
ed., 2003). 
 25 See discussion infra Part III. 
 26 James Madison, Letter to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 346–47 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) [hereinafter Madison, 
Letter to Washington]. 
 27 The extension of the Clause to require deference to public acts and the implicit exemption 
for private bills both reflect a concern with enforcing a coherent and effective nationwide struc-
ture for creditor litigation. The provision for public acts requires states (and potentially authorizes 
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Finally, this Article shows that the language of the Clause reflects 
Madison‘s political theory underlying the Constitution itself. The first 
sentence is mandatory because it, like many parts of the Constitution, 
was designed to restrict state sovereignty and freedom of action. The 
power granted to Congress in the second sentence, however, is discre-
tionary to reflect the fact that Congress, as the supreme lawmaking 
power of the nation, not only cannot be forced to take action, but would 
also be, Madison expected, the final arbiter of its own obligations under 
the Constitution.28 This understanding of congressional constitutional 
supremacy, so different from our own, largely explains why Madison 
was not troubled by, and appears to have not even noticed, the potential 
contradiction between the first and second sentences of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.  
The question whether Congress can constitutionally pass a law, 
like DOMA, which appears to contradict the first sentence of the Clause 
makes sense to us because we assume, as the question does, that there is 
an authoritative source of constitutional interpretation separate from the 
actions of Congress. That authority, of course, is the Supreme Court. 
When we ask whether a federal law is unconstitutional, we may not be 
asking whether the actual Supreme Court would strike it down, but we 
are at least comparing the decision of Congress with an independent 
constitutional standard, to be applied by a hypothetical Supreme Court, 
most likely one that thinks about constitutional law the way we do. The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause appears contradictory to us because we as-
sume both sentences are legal rules that can and must be construed by 
an outside legal authority (the Supreme Court) to determine the scope of 
congressional authority to prescribe the effects of state laws in other 
states. For James Madison in 1787, however, the newly created Su-
preme Court was a hypothetical institution of unknown effectiveness, 
which he hoped would be able to exercise some restraint on state legis-
lation that was in conflict with the new Constitution.29 He did not con-
ceive that it could or should be an effective check on the federal legisla-
ture itself, much less the final arbiter of all constitutional questions. For 
Madison, that final arbiter was Congress itself, which was given broad 
new powers under the Constitution and whose acts would be the su-
 
Congress) to apply choice of law rules to ensure that debts incurred in one state are subject to re-
payment under the same statutory conditions in other states. See infra notes 178–83 and accom-
panying text. The exemption for private bills prevents debtors who incur large debts in one state 
from obtaining a personal legislative discharge of such debts in another. See infra notes 178–83 
and accompanying text. 
 28 See discussion infra Part III. 
 29 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–74 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE]; Jack N. Rakove, The Ori-
gins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1044–46 (1997) [he-
reinafter Rakove, Origins]. 
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preme law of the land.30 While it is true that the Constitution contained 
some theoretical limits on congressional lawmaking power, Madison 
was enough of a practical politician and student of political power to 
doubt that such theoretical limits could be effective in the absence of 
countervailing political forces.31 Accordingly, Madison believed that 
congressional restraint ultimately rested on Congress itself, on the na-
tional perspective and independence that representatives would gain by 
being elected directly by the people, by the need to form large coalitions 
to govern effectively and thereby dilute the effect of ―factions,‖ and by 
the representatives‘ and senators‘ own sense of honor and political vir-
tue.32 And Madison recognized that the success of such internal re-
straints was by no means assured. 
Seen from this perspective, the potential contradiction between the 
first and second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is substan-
tially lessened. The first sentence sets forth a mandatory but somewhat 
vague obligation of the states toward one another as coordinate mem-
bers of a federal union. The second sentence expressly gives the federal 
legislature the power to further define and enforce that obligation. 
Might Congress misuse the power granted to it under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause? Of course, just like it might misuse many other powers 
granted to it to weaken rather than strengthen the federal union. Would 
such actions be unconstitutional? From a practical legal or political 
perspective, the question was close to meaningless. For Madison in 
1787, there was no meaningful distinction between Congress misusing 
its constitutional power and Congress acting unconstitutionally.33 The 
real question was whether the language of the Constitution, and their 
own sense of political virtue, could normatively constrain Congress 
from acting in ways that injured the federal union or permitted states to 
violate each other‘s rights. 
Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence of Madison‘s views to 
strongly suggest that he would have considered congressional actions to 
weaken or abrogate existing obligations of sister-state deference to be 
not just unwise and unjust, but subject to condemnation as ―unconstitu-
tional‖ as well. Unlike powers that appropriately belonged to the federal 
legislature irrespective of how they were exercised, Madison‘s justifica-
tion for the powers granted under the second sentence of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause were based on how Madison expected those powers 
 
 30 See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 31 The Bill of Rights, which Madison originally opposed and whose effectiveness he always 
doubted, had many more such limitations. See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 9, 62, 159 (2006); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the 
Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 302–03 (1990). 
 32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Strahan, supra note 18, at 63; see also discus-
sion infra Part III.C. 
 33 See infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text. 
YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC 9/9/2011  6:08 PM 
2011] MADISON’S  FULL FAITH AND CREDIT  135 
to be used, namely, to ―provide for the harmony and proper intercourse 
among the states.‖34 He sought justification for federal legislation per-
mitting judgments obtained in one state to be executed in others, not 
based on plenary congressional power to prescribe any rules it wished, 
but by ―the nature of the [Federal] Union.‖35 Finally, there is a substan-
tial likelihood that Madison and other Founders believed that some un-
certain but significant level of deference to the judgments of sister states 
was part of unwritten natural law principles embodied in the law of na-
tions, and that such deference could be increased by legislative enact-
ments, but that any legislative attempt to weaken or abrogate such defe-
rence would violate fundamental law.36 
What emerges from this analysis is a picture of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause that has significant similarities to the ―one way ratchet‖ 
interpretation of the Clause that has been used to argue that DOMA is 
unconstitutional,37 but one in which the presumed constraints on con-
gressional action are the product of national interest, political virtue, 
and natural law, as well as the language of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Madison inserted mandatory language into the first sentence of 
the Clause because he wanted it to be a mandatory obligation of the 
states created and enforced by the federal government. With respect to 
Congress itself, however, Madison believed the first sentence could on-
ly function as an instruction to Congress to act properly, in a political 
sense, by passing laws necessary to strengthen the federal union, and 
refrain from passing laws that weakened or permitted states to weaken 
it. The potential inconsistency in the Clause arises only if Congress acts 
badly in these Madisonian terms. Although Madison was undoubtedly 
aware that such congressional misconduct could occur, he thought that 
the danger of such anti-federal actions by a national legislature was 
small and certainly far less than leaving the power to prescribe the ef-
fects of state judgments to state courts or state legislatures.38 Moreover, 
compared to other types of congressional misconduct that Madison 
feared might imperil the union, the likelihood that Congress would pass 
 
 34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 35 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448. 
 36 See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 
1137–39 (1987); see also discussion infra note 205. 
 37 The interpretation of the Clause as a ―one way ratchet,‖ was first put forward by Laurence 
Tribe and Ralph S. Taylor, Jr., in a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy opposing the Defense of 
Marriage Act. It interprets the first sentence of the Clause as establishing a constitutionally man-
datory minimum level of state deference toward sister states which can be increased by Congres-
sional action, but not decreased or abrogated by Congress. 142 CONG. REC. S5931 (daily ed. June 
6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch., and Ralph S. Taylor, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. 
Senator (May 24, 1996)). Tribe and Taylor‘s argument, however, made no reference to historical 
materials. This Article demonstrates that such an interpretation has strong support in well-
established historical sources of the Founding period. 
 38 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
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laws that abrogated the full faith and credit mandate must have seemed 
to Madison to be vanishingly small. In this, of course, Madison was cor-
rect. The republic had been in existence for over 200 years before Con-
gress took any such action.39 
This Article sets forth the historical bases for this new and some-
what controversial account of Madison‘s Full Faith and Credit Clause. It 
consists of three parts. Part I looks at the period immediately prior to the 
drafting of the Clause, focusing particularly on the political and legal 
controversies surrounding interstate enforcement of debts during this 
period, the development of Madison‘s political thought and critique of 
existing state legislatures as well as Madison‘s views as expressed in the 
major political debates of the first half of the Constitutional Convention. 
Part II takes a detailed look at the debates leading to the adoption 
of the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause and the historical con-
troversies that have arisen concerning it. It shows that in those debates, 
Madison achieved pretty much what he wanted: a somewhat vague but 
mandatory obligation on the part of the states to act as part of a coordi-
nated legal system, an obligation that could be ―racheted up‖ over time 
through federal legislation. 
Part III focuses on the apparent contradiction between the first and 
second sentences of the clause and the way that potential contradiction 
would have appeared to Madison before the development of judicial re-
view and the establishment of the Supreme Court as final arbiter of con-
stitutional issues. 
 
I.     FULL FAITH AND CREDIT BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION 
A.     Madison at the Start of the Constitutional Convention 
 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was a creation of the latter part of 
the Constitutional Convention, the months of August and early Septem-
ber 1787, when the great compromises involving power-sharing had 
been reached and the Committee on Style was revising and meshing the 
various draft proposals of the early Convention into a single coherent 
draft of a supreme law for the United States.40 Yet its creation was 
strongly influenced by the debates that had preceded it. 
 
 39 For that reason, until the passage of DOMA, there was no case law and very little commen-
tary on the meaning or appropriate interpretation of the second sentence of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. See 142 CONG. REC. S5932-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kenne-
dy) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., and Ralph S. Taylor, 
Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator (May 24, 1996)); Crane, 
Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 311–12. 
 40 See 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 445–89. 
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James Madison came to the Convention probably more prepared 
for the job of constitution-making than any other delegate. After attend-
ing the College of New Jersey (today, Princeton University), from 
which he graduated in two years, Madison served in the Virginia Con-
vention in 1776 and two terms in the Virginia House of Delegates.41 In 
1780, he became the youngest member of the Continental Congress, but 
―[w]ithin two years, the awkward freshman had become the most effec-
tive man in Congress,‖42 and was frequently chosen for service on criti-
cal committees.43 His service in Congress had made him acutely aware 
of the deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation and he was a leader 
in congressional movements to reform them.44 
Madison had also conducted his own intellectual study of republi-
can forms of government in both classical and modern times,45 and had 
developed a powerful and coherent critique of the deficiencies of the 
current American government. This was set forth most clearly and suc-
cinctly in a document he wrote in April 1787 (just before the beginning 
of the Constitutional Convention) titled Vices of the Political System of 
the United States.46 
The vices involved were primarily those of the states and state leg-
islatures, which had refused to comply with constitutional requisitions 
and were levying customs duties, concluding treaties with the Indians 
and usurping other powers of the federal government and failing to 
comply with treaties validly made by the United States in accordance 
with the law of nations.47 Yet Madison also saw as a central defect of 
the current system, the ―trespasses of the states on the rights of each 
other,‖ citing these as ―alarming symptoms‖ which may be ―daily ap-
prehended.‖48 Although his first and clearest example is the favoritism 
 
 41 Madison began at Princeton in 1769 and graduated in 1771. IRVING BRANT, JAMES 
MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REVOLUTIONIST 69, 96 (1941) [hereinafter BRANT, REVOLUTIONIST]. 
He then stayed an extra half-year, probably for health, but he also continued his studies in law and 
languages. Id. at 96–103; KETCHAM, supra note 18, at 51. He served in the Virginia legislature 
from 1776–1777, and 1784–1786. See BRANT, REVOLUTIONIST, supra, at 190, 313–15; IRVING 
BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 343 (1948) [hereinafter BRANT, NATIONALIST]; 
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
42 n.149 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]. 
 42 BANNING, supra note 15, at 13. 
 43 Id. at 19. 
 44 See id. at 43–49; RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 45–47. 
 45 James Madison, Of Ancient and Modern Confederacies, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 369 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) (1787) [hereinafter Madison, Of 
Ancient]. Madison apparently prepared these historical notes in the form of a small thirty-page 
pamphlet that he intended to carry with him, presumably to the constitutional debates. Id. at 369 
n.1. 
 46 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 361. 
 47 Id. at 361–62. 
 48 Id. These are ―alarming symptoms‖ presumably, of the breakdown of the federal union. For 
a discussion of the interstate economic conflicts existing during the Confederation period, see 
Robertson, supra note 24, at 186–91. 
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shown by the states to their own citizens in providing port facilities, he 
found equally troubling the state laws that interfered with debt collec-
tion by out-of-state creditors. As he stated: 
Paper money, instalments of debts, occlusion of Courts, making 
property a legal tender, may likewise be deemed aggressions on the 
rights of other States. As the Citizens of every State aggregately tak-
en stand more or less in the relation of Creditors or debtors, to the 
citizens of every other state, Acts of the Debtor state in favor of deb-
tors affect the Creditor State, in the same manner as they do its own 
citizens who are relatively creditors toward other citizens. This re-
mark may be extended to foreign nations. If the exclusive regulation 
of the value and alloy of coin was properly delegated to the federal 
authority, the policy of it equally requires a controul on the States in 
the cases above mentioned.49 
There is much in this paragraph that is relevant to understanding 
Madison‘s approach to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Note first Mad-
ison‘s observation—which as we will see was an accurate reflection of 
the political realities of the time—that states could be categorized as 
relatively pro-debtor or pro-creditor, based presumably on the aggregate 
power of those factions on the legislature of the state. Note also his 
view that legislative recognition of paper money, installment payments, 
and property as legal tender all constituted infringements on the rights 
of creditor states, as did limiting the rights of creditors to sue in the 
courts of that state. One might, of course, have equally well made the 
argument that pro-creditor states like Massachusetts, which required all 
debts to be paid in specie, were infringing the rights of debtor states, but 
his statement reflects, I believe, a consistent pro-creditor bias in Madi-
son‘s thought, although Madison would more likely have described it as 
a concern with protecting the ―vested rights‖ of contractual creditors.50 
Moreover, Madison‘s capitalization of ―Acts‖ in ―Acts of the Debtor 
states,‖ while not dispositive given the casual approach to spelling at the 
time, suggests that Madison was thinking about the ways that legislative 
acts of one state could disrupt commercial relations in other states.51 Fi-
nally, Madison points out that an effective federal authority would have 
 
 49 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 362. As Robertson notes, a loose coalition of ―[m]any 
(though not all) merchants, manufacturers and creditors‖ shared an interest in, among other 
things, ―protecting commercial credit.‖ Robertson, supra note 24, at 193. 
 50 Jennifer Nedelsky extensively analyzes the central role that property rights played in Madi-
sonian thought. NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 16–66; see also discussion of 
bankruptcy/creditors‘ rights infra Part I.C. As Nedelsky notes, Madison‘s concerns over debtor 
relief laws permitting payment of debts in paper money was part of this general concern over 
state legislative infringement of property rights. NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, 
at 22–23. A prohibition on states permitting payment of debts in anything but specie was later 
incorporated into Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution. 
 51 See NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 30 (noting that the ―legislative in-
justice‖ Madison feared most was not direct confiscation, but ―interferences with the security of 
expectation and transaction‖). 
YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC 9/9/2011  6:08 PM 
2011] MADISON’S  FULL FAITH AND CREDIT  139 
a strong incentive to control states that sought to devalue the currency 
for repayment of debts, both to preserve American creditworthiness in 
foreign commerce and to avoid conflicts among the states. 
This in turn points to Madison‘s proposed solution to the vices of 
the current system, which is, in short, a more powerful and effective na-
tional government. Madison stated plainly that the ―most fatal if not 
more frequent cause‖ of these vices ―lies in the people themselves,‖52 
particularly in their tendency to form ―factions,‖ which then become a 
majority that oppresses a minority or individuals. This tendency toward 
faction will be weaker in a large republic, however, than in a small one. 
In a large republic, Madison stated, ―[t]he Society becomes broken into 
a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passions, which check each 
other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less oppor-
tunity of communication and concert.‖53 
Yet it is worth noting that Madison does not think that a large re-
public will eliminate the problem of faction by itself. Rather, he hopes it 
will ameliorate the effect of factional interests on legislators sufficiently 
so that other more beneficial incentives will motivate those legislators‘ 
actions. These incentives were concern for the long-term general good, 
concerns for justice (which Madison here conflates with religious belief, 
while recognizing that religion can also lead to faction), and ―respect for 
character,‖ by which Madison apparently meant the desire to enhance 
one‘s honor and reputation.54 In illustrating the relative weakness of 
such motivations, Madison again used as an illustration the legislative 
approval of paper money. He asked, ―[i]s it to be imagined that an ordi-
nary citizen or even Assemblyman of R. Island in estimating the policy 
of paper money, ever considered or cared, in what light the measure was 
viewed in France or Holland, or even in [Massachusetts] or [Connecti-
cut]?‖55 Madison seemed to imply that paper money would not only be 
viewed unfavorably, but as a sign of poor character in all those jurisdic-
tions. Madison concluded that a larger republic must also be joined with 
an election process ―as will most certainly extract from the mass of so-
ciety the purest and noblest characters which it contains.‖56 A change in 
the character of the legislators was as important to ameliorating the vic-
es of the system as a change in the governing law. 
 
 52 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 366. 
 53 Id. at 368. This of course is the beginning of Madison‘s famous argument, set forth most 
memorably in Federalist 10, that a large republic can be a ―remedy‖ for the problem of faction. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 54 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 367. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 369. 
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B.     “Full Faith and Credit” in the Articles of Confederation 
 
In his discussion of the vices of the current political system, Madi-
son distinguished those actions of the states that clearly violate their ob-
ligations under the Articles of Confederation or international law (like 
failure to pay requisitions or abide by federal treaty obligations) and 
those that occur, at least in part, because of an absence of federal au-
thority (such as failure to require common action on matters of national 
importance, or to protect states against internal violence).57 On one im-
portant evil of the system, the tendency of states to trespass on each 
other‘s rights, Madison did not state whether most such actions violate 
the Articles of Confederation, probably because he himself was unsure 
of the answer.58 
The Articles of Confederation did contain a provision that seemed 
to mandate some level of interstate deference, at least with respect to 
judicial proceedings. It stated: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to the 
records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates 
of every other State.59 
The meaning of this provision and particularly the term ―full faith 
and credit‖ has been the subject of important recent scholarly work. The 
focus of this section, however, will be on a fact that those scholars rec-
ognize but whose historical significance, I believe, they do not fully ap-
preciate. That is, that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the 
faith and credit clause in the Articles of Confederation had no clear and 
determinate meaning. 
The clause was born in confusion. Added as part of a revision of 
the Articles that took place in 1777, at the time of its passage, an 
amendment was proposed that included not only the ―full faith and cre-
dit‖ mandate but explicitly provided that an ―Action of Debt may lie in 
the Court of Law in any State for the Recovery of a Debt due on Judg-
ment of any Court in any other State‖ provided that the judgment credi-
tor posted a sufficient bond.60 This provision, which might appear to 
 
 57 Id. at 363–65. 
 58 With regard to one such trespass, the tendency of states to impose tariffs and other restric-
tions on commerce with other states, Madison does note that it is ―not contrary to the federal ar-
ticles‖ but is ―certainly adverse to the spirit of the Union.‖ Id. at 363. He makes no similar com-
ment, however, with regard to his other examples, including the ―occlusion of the courts‖ to the 
collection of debts. 
 59 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV. This full faith and credit clause was not 
part of the original Articles of Confederation, but was added in November 1777. See Sachs, supra 
note 1, at 1223–24. It became effective on March 1, 1781. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures 
Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1725 (2009). 
 60 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 35 (citing 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 887 
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create a rule of substantive deference, at least for debt actions,61 was 
voted on separately from the full faith and credit mandate.‖ The full 
faith and credit mandate passed, apparently without debate, but the rest 
of the provision, as well as a another proposed amendment requiring 
that the judgment debtor must have had notice of the ―original writ upon 
which judgment shall be founded‖ were defeated.62 
One can interpret this muddled history one of three ways. First, 
that since the more explicit requirement suggesting substantive defe-
rence was voted down, the remaining full faith and credit mandate must 
refer only to an evidentiary rule.63 Second, that the rule remained one of 
substantive deference, but without express requirements regarding post-
ing of bonds or prior notice. Third, that the rule, intentionally left vague, 
signified only that the states owed one another‘s judgments some level 
of deference, possibly greater than that which existed between indepen-
dent nations. 
The litigation engendered by the Articles‘ clause reflects all these 
differing points of view. There were three reported decisions involving 
the Article of Confederation‘s full faith and credit clause decided prior 
to the Constitutional Convention.64 Any of the Founders familiar with 
them would have concluded, as Madison did, that the Articles‘ clause 
was ―extremely indeterminate.‖65 
Jenkins v. Putnam was an action for trover in South Carolina for 
slaves taken by an American privateer.66 The slaves had been sold in a 
prior condemnation proceeding in a North Carolina admiralty court.67 
The South Carolina court held that it was ―bound by the sentence of the 
Court of Admiralty in North Carolina‖ and that ―[t]he act of confedera-
tion is conclusive as to this point, and the law of nations, is equally 
strong upon it.‖68 
 
(Worthington Chauncy Ford et al. eds., 1907)). 
 61 Engdahl believes the provision regarding debt actions still embodies no more than a prima 
facie evidentiary rule. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1610. Whitten finds the available historical evi-
dence inconclusive on the point. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 524–26. Na-
delmann, relying largely on the temporal proximity between this proposal and the passage of a 
Massachusetts law providing substantive deference for sister state debt actions, leans toward a 
substantive deference reading, but ultimately cites Madison, who stated in another context, ―[t]he 
truth, perhaps, in this as in many other instances, is, that if the compilers of the text had severally 
declared their meanings, these would have been diverse as the comments made upon it.‖ Nadel-
mann, supra note 3, at 49 (citing Madison‘s Letter to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 10, 1784), in 1 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 66, 67 (1865)). 
 62 See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 36. 
 63 See, e.g., Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 280 n.82; Sachs, supra note 1, at 
1224. 
 64 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1786); Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784). 
 65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 66 Jenkins, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 8. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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In James v. Allen, a debtor who had obtained a discharge from im-
prisonment for a debt in New Jersey sought to use that judgment to ob-
tain a discharge from the same debt in Pennsylvania.69 The common 
pleas court held that the order relied on, the discharge from imprison-
ment, did not go to the ―substance of the . . . demand‖ and had ―no con-
nection with the merits of the cause.‖70 It was a ―private act . . . local in 
its nature, and local in its terms,‖ and therefore did not have any effect 
in Pennsylvania.71 The court went on to say, however, that the full faith 
and credit clause of the Articles seemed ―chiefly intended to oblige each 
State to receive the records of another as full evidence of such Acts and 
judicial proceedings.‖72 
 
 69 James, 1 Dall. at 189. The attorney for the debtor, Thomas Bradford, Jr., then Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania (apparently a part time position), and later Attorney General of the Unit-
ed States, USDOJ: AG: ABOUT THE OFFICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=1 (last 
visited July 24, 2011), put forward an original argument that acknowledged, to some degree, the 
vagueness and uncertainly surrounding the Article‘s full faith and credit mandate. In response to 
the creditor‘s argument that the rule was merely evidentiary, he stated: 
But, should the Defendant find no protection under the law of nations, the 4th Article 
of the Confederation, effectually supplies that defect. The article declares that ―full 
faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial 
proceedings, of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State.‖ Now, if a judgment, 
or other judicial proceeding in New-Jersey had not been evidence before, this provision 
(to the true sense of which the law of Pennsylvania is subservient) would have made it 
so—if it was only prima facie evidence before, this would render it conclusive. 
James, 1 Dall. at 190. This argument—that the Articles‘ Clause must provide for a somewhat 
greater level of deference than exists among independent nations—is one that we will see recur-
ring in debates over the constitutional clause. What is worth noting here is that Bradford‘s argu-
ment presupposes substantial uncertainty regarding the level of deference required under the law 
of nations as well as under the Articles‘ Clause. William Bradford, Jr., by the way, was a close 
friend of Madison‘s from college days. See William Bradford (1755-1795), University of Penn-
sylvania Archives, http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/bradford_wm.html (last visited 
July 24, 2011). 
 70 James, 1 Dall. at 191. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 191-92. For Sachs, this language provides the best evidence for his position that the 
Articles‘ clause was a pure ―authentication‖ rule, and he quarrels with Engdahl, who sees it as 
another example of a prima facie rule. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1588; Sachs, supra note 1, 1226, 
1226 n.103. Yet a few paragraphs earlier in the opinion, the Judge also states that ―[t]he Judgment 
of a foreign Court establishing a demand against a Defendant, or discharging him from it, accord-
ing to the laws of that country, would certainly have a binding force here[.]‖ James, 1 Dall. at 
191. While this sentence is admittedly dicta, and does not mention the Articles‘ clause, it is hard 
to understand how the judge could maintain that foreign judgments have ―binding force‖ but sis-
ter state judgments under the Articles merely had to be treated as ―full evidence‖ of the prior pro-
ceedings. Id. at 191. I suspect the reason is that Judge Shippen makes the latter comment only 
after he has held that the discharge in that case was ―local in its terms‖ and not intended to have 
any out of state effects. Id. Accordingly, treating the discharge as authentic, as required by the 
Articles‘ clause, does not trigger any obligation to give it out-of-state effect. The earlier sentence, 
however, is a general statement under the law of nations concerning the effect of a valid foreign 
judgment that would appear to trigger an obligation of ―binding‖ deference. Note, however, that 
this obligation under the law of nations does not seem to have been included, much less en-
hanced, by the Articles‘ clause. In that sense, it is a repudiation of Bradford‘s argument noted 
above. See id. 
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Finally, in Kibbe v. Kibbe, a Massachusetts creditor brought suit in 
Connecticut based on a prior Massachusetts judgment.73 The prior 
judgment had been entered by default, based on the attachment of de-
fendant‘s handkerchief, although notice of the action had been served 
on defendant‘s home in Connecticut.74 The Superior Court of Connecti-
cut held that the prior judgment was invalid for lack of personal juris-
diction, noting that ―the defendant was an inhabitant of the state of 
Connecticut, and was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas for the county of Berkshire, at the time of the pretended ser-
vice of the writ; therefore, the court had no legal jurisdiction of the 
cause.‖ It went on to note, however, that: 
[F]ull credence ought to be given to judgments of the courts in any of 
the United States, where both parties are within the jurisdiction of 
such courts at the time of commencing the suit, and are duly served 
with the process, and have or might have had a fair trial of the cause; 
all which, with the original cause of action, ought to appear by the 
plaintiff‘s declaration in action of debt on such judgment.75 
This, of course, is dicta, but it makes the court seem at least con-
genial to applying a rule of substantive deference to out-of-state judg-
ments in cases where there has been appropriate notice and opportunity 
to be heard. 
So we have three cases construing the Articles‘ full faith and credit 
clause in the years preceding the Constitutional Convention. One ap-
plies a rule of substantive deference, based on both the clause and admi-
ralty law, but could have relied solely on the latter.76 One holds that the 
 
 73 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786). 
 74 Id. at 126. 
 75 Id. The Judge goes on to note: 
That the original action was upon a covenant real, and locally annexed where the lands 
lie; and the judgment being by default, this court never could take cognizance of or ex-
amine into the justice of the cause; therefore, cannot enforce the judgment on which 
this action is brought. 
Id. Professor Engdahl makes the innovative argument that this language really supports the evi-
dentiary interpretation of the full faith and credit clause, since ―examin[ation] into the justice of 
the cause,‖ id., would be appropriate, indeed required, under an evidentiary rule, but not under a 
rule of substantive deference. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1615-16. The problem with this interpre-
tation is that the court also specifically states that it is the default judgment that seems to prevent 
such examination into the justice of the cause. See Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 126. An evidentiary interpre-
tation would seem to require reexamination of the cause of any prior judgment, default or merits-
based. An alternative interpretation would be that, as the judge noted previously, the only judg-
ments subject to ―full credence‖ [i.e., substantive deference] are those where both parties ―have or 
might have had a fair trial of the cause‖ and that examination into the possibility of such a fair 
trial is not possible when judgment is entered by default. Id. 
  It should also be noted that the judge who authored this dicta, Eliphalet Dyer, was a dele-
gate to the Continental Congress in 1777 and voted in favor of the proposed additions to the full 
faith and credit clause (substantive deference, notice and bonding), which were ultimately de-
feated. See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 36. 
 76 Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784). Whitten also 
points out that the decision can be justified under a view of English law that ―used defensively, all 
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statute involved had no out-of-state effects, but provides a strong en-
dorsement, in dicta, of the evidentiary interpretation of the clause.77 The 
third goes off on jurisdictional grounds, but states that in cases where 
the original court had jurisdiction, ―full credence‖ ought to be given to 
such judgments.78 I submit that what these precedents really establish is 
that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, there was no clear or 
well-established legal meaning attached to the full faith and credit 
mandate in the Articles of Confederation.79 
A slightly broader view of these cases further supports this conten-
tion. Such cases are interesting not only for their holdings, but for what 
they reveal about what areas of the law were considered settled, and 
which were the subjects of ongoing dispute. The level of deference re-
quired by the Articles‘ full faith and credit clause clearly falls in the lat-
ter category. In the five years it was in effect from 1781 to 1786, it en-
gendered three major cases80 (with two more following in 1788).81 In 
each of them the effect of the Articles of Confederation was argued, 
with both the evidentiary and substantive interpretations of the rule ad-
vanced. It is perhaps significant that in none of these cases do the courts 
base their rulings on a straightforward interpretation of the Articles‘ 
clause. They either avoid the question entirely by relying on jurisdic-
tional or other grounds, or rely equally on principles of comity and the 
law of nations. While this could be mere coincidence, I submit it is 
more likely a judicial strategy that is still common today. When faced 
with a novel and difficult legal issue, judges often choose to avoid it, 
either by deciding the case on other grounds, or relying on multiple 
 
foreign judgments were conclusive.‖ Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 536. 
 77 James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1786). 
 78 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786). 
 79 This is also pretty much the conclusion reached by Nadelmann, Whitten, and Sachs. That 
is, that no definitive interpretation of the meaning of the Articles‘ clause can be derived from the 
existing case law. See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 53; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1224–26; Whitten, 
State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 540. Only Engdahl maintains that, taken as a whole, 
these cases support a ―prima facie rule‖ interpretation of the Articles‘ clause, except for admiralty 
cases. Engdahl, supra note 3, at 1618. 
 80 Jenkins, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 8; James, 1 Dall. at 188; Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 119. 
 81 The two additional cases were Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788), and Phelps v. Holker, 
1 Dall. 261 (Pa. 1788). In Millar, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a bankruptcy dis-
charge obtained in Maryland to an action in Pennsylvania, although it did not rely explicitly on 
the Articles, but on general principles of justice and the law of nations. 1 Dall. at 229–31. Phelps, 
like Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 123, involved a suit to enforce a Massachusetts in rem judgment, though in 
Phelps, the matter was the attachment of a blanket. Phelps, 1 Dall. at 261. The Phelps court re-
fused to give the prior judgment conclusive effect, but like Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 121, the holding 
seems based primarily on the holding that the Massachusetts court lacked in personam jurisdic-
tion over the debtor or the full amount of the claimed debt. Phelps, 1 Dall. at 263–64. One of the 
four judges, however, Atlee, in a concurring opinion, argued that the prior judgment was not 
―conclusive evidence‖ by adverting to the provisions of the Articles which had been defeated in 
1777. Id. at 261; see also Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 410 (Mass. 1805) (Sedgwick, J.) (criti-
cizing Judge Atlee‘s argument in Phelps). 
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grounds for their decision. It seems likely that the ―correct‖ interpreta-
tion of the Articles‘ full faith and credit clause was considered just such 
a novel and difficult legal issue. 
The fact that distinguished lawyers were willing to argue both 
sides of this issue is further evidence that the meaning of ―full faith and 
credit‖ was far from clear or settled prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion. While lawyers are of course paid to argue for their clients, it seems 
unlikely that most lawyers then, or now, would choose to make argu-
ments which they felt the authorities they cited could not support, or 
which might injure their reputation as reliable and knowledgeable jur-
ists. In that regard, it is interesting that Jared Ingersoll, one of the lead-
ing attorneys in Philadelphia (and a delegate to the Constitutional Con-
vention) argued in James in 1786 for the evidentiary interpretation of 
the Articles‘ clause,82 and two years later, in Millar v. Hall83 and Phelps 
v. Holker,84 argued that the clause created a rule of substantive defe-
rence. The meaning of the clause, in short, was a litigable issue, one on 
which competent authorities and respectable arguments could be found 
for either side.85 
It is also worth examining these cases to see what relationship they 
assume exists between the Articles‘ clause and the deference obligations 
for foreign judgments created under the law of nations. In Jenkins, the 
Articles‘ clause and the law of nations are said to constitute two inde-
pendent and equally strong grounds for a rule of substantive deference, 
at least in admiralty cases.86 In James, in contrast, the rule of substan-
tive deference that exists for some foreign judgments under the law of 
nations does not appear to have been incorporated in any way into the 
Articles‘ clause, which remains a pure evidentiary rule.87 Kibbe relies 
on general principles of jurisdiction, which are presumably derived 
 
 82 James, 1 Dall. at 191. 
 83 Millar, 1 Dall. at 231. 
 84 Phelps, 1 Dall. at 262. 
 85 Nadelmann offers one further piece of evidence of the indeterminacy with which the Con-
federation‘s clause was viewed. He tells us of a committee of the Continental Congress which, on 
August 22, 1781, (shortly after Maryland‘s ratification made the Articles effective) reported that 
the Confederation required ―execution‖ in among others, the following respect: ―By declaring the 
method of exemplifying records and the operation of the Acts and judicial proceedings of the 
Courts of one State contravening those of the States in which they are asserted . . . .‖ Nadelmann, 
supra note 3, at 53 n.95. Nadelmann accurately notes that this shows, at least, that ―the drafters 
saw two different problems in need of clarification, one formal, the method of exemplification, 
and the other substantive, the effect of a foreign judgment or proceeding.‖ Id. It is also worth not-
ing that two of the three members of that committee, Oliver Ellsworth and Edmund Randolph, 
were both distinguished lawyers and future delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Id.; see 
also 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 894 (Worthington C. Ford et al. 
eds., 1904–37). 
 86 Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8, 8–9 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784). 
 87 See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
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from the law of nations, but makes no mention of the Articles‘ clause.88 
In short, the question of the relationship between the Articles‘ clause 
and the deference obligations under the law of nations is at least as opa-
que and uncertain as the extent of the deference obligation under the 
clause itself. 
As a final proof of the indeterminacy of the Article‘s full faith and 
credit clause, we can return to James Madison and his retrospective 
comments in Federalist No. 42, the only place in The Federalist Papers 
where the Full Faith and Credit Clause (both that of the Constitution 
and of the Articles) is discussed. With respect to the Articles‘ clause, 
Madison tells us, ―[t]he meaning of the [Articles‘ full faith and credit 
clause] is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under 
any interpretation which it will bear.‖89 
With respect to the first part of Madison‘s statement, the ―extreme 
indeterminacy‖ of the clause,90 we have seen that it is a well-supported 
and justifiable position. His claim that it can be of ―little importance‖ 
under any reasonable interpretation may reflect, in part, the fact that he 
is dealing in The Federalist Papers with the most profound questions of 
political theory as they apply to the future of his country. The choice be-
tween a rule of evidentiary or substantive deference for out-of-state 
judgments may appear like very small potatoes in such circumstances.91 
But we know that Madison did not take the problem of states‘ interfe-
rence with one another lightly. Part of the problem was that a rule li-
mited to judgments was too narrow for the kind of interstate coordina-
 
 88 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786). Similarly, Millar v. Hall relies 
heavily, explicitly and primarily on the law of nations, with only one minor nod to the ―reciprocal 
obligation of the states under the articles of confederation,‖ which are presumed to conform to 
these principles of ―general conveniency, expediency, justice, and humanity.‖ 1 Dall. at 232. Fi-
nally, Phelps v. Holker, which also goes off on jurisdictional grounds, gives us four separate judi-
cial opinions, one (Bryan) based solely on Massachusetts law, another (Atlee) based on a histori-
cal interpretation of the enactment of the Articles‘ Clause, and two (M‘Kean and Rush) which 
seem to imply at least that the Articles‘ Clause does not provide conclusive out-of-state effect to 
judgments issued in rem. 1 Dall. at 261-64. 
 89 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Whitten finds it ―highly unlikely‖ that a rule of conclusive deference could be considered 
by Madison to be of ―little importance.‖ Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 554. 
Yet to make this argument one has to believe that a rule of conclusive deference was not even 
considered by Madison a plausible interpretation of the Articles‘ clause, something belied by the 
case law under the Articles, as well as by Madison‘s own statements. Far more likely was that 
Madison believed that neither a prima facie nor a conclusive rule of deference were particularly 
effective in enforcing debt obligations. After all, even under the evidentiary interpretation of the 
clause, proof of the existence of the prior judgment was enough to establish a prima facie case. 
For debtors who defaulted or had no defense on the merits, the difference was indeed of ―little 
importance.‖ Id. It should also be noted that the default rates in eighteenth century American liti-
gation were extremely high. In her study of colonial litigation in New York Supreme Court, De-
borah Rosen found that by the 1750s, the default rate in cases in New York County was approx-
imately sixty percent. For other New York counties it averaged eighty-four percent. See Rosen, 
Supreme Court, supra note 12, at 213, 230. 
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tion he sought. It did not, for example, deal with laws providing for re-
payment of debts with paper money, or the effects of various bankrupt-
cy laws on prior debts. The most pressing problem he saw, however, 
was that under either a prima facie or conclusive rule, the need to insti-
tute an additional action gave the defaulting debtor a chance to escape 
across state lines. For Madison, the truly effective and sensible solution 
is one that provided for execution of out-of-state judgments. That was 
the power Madison sought for Congress and was the ―power here estab-
lished‖ by the second sentence of the Clause, which he goes on to state 
may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and maybe 
particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the 
effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated at 
any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.92 
Although the precise meaning of the Articles‘ clause remains un-
certain, we can get a better understanding of the constitutional clause by 
examining it in relation to Madison‘s broader normative goals at the 
time of the Founding. That is the task of the next two sections. 
 
C.     Economic Implications of Full Faith and Credit 
 
We have seen that at the time of the Founding, the issue of inter-
state deference to judgments was closely intertwined with the enforce-
ment and collection of interstate debts. Recall that this was a primary 
focus of Madison‘s concerns about interstate trespasses—the way in 
which pro-debtor states created laws that interfered with the proper col-
lection of debts by out-of-state creditors.93 More broadly, the full faith 
and credit clause in the Articles of Confederation was about enforce-
ment of out-of-state court judgments, and court judgments, in eigh-
teenth-century America, predominantly involved the results of debtor-
creditor litigation.94 The reported cases under the Articles‘ full faith and 
 
 92 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 93 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 94 As Bruce Mann notes, the debtor-creditor relationship in the late eighteenth century ―was a 
legal one, defined by the formal rules that governed the creation and collection of debts.‖ BRUCE 
MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 33 
(2002). Deborah Rosen, in her study of colonial New York courts, found that ―[l]egal practice of 
the period from 1690 to 1760 evolved in the way it did because debt litigation increasingly domi-
nated the courts‘ dockets as New York became a more commercialized society.‖ Deborah Rosen, 
Courts and Commerce in Colonial New York, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 139, 151 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Rosen, Courts and Commerce]. Rosen also found that this increase in debt litigation was ac-
companied by very high rates of default judgments. Id. at 153. While there were many reasons for 
this high default rate, at least one of them is directly relevant to Madison‘s concerns: the likelih-
ood of insolvent debtors ―fleeing to another colony where distance and procedural rules made 
arrest unlikely.‖ MANN, supra, at 26. 
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credit clause are consistent with Madison‘s economic concerns. Of the 
five, four involve suits for unpaid debts.95 
The post-revolutionary period was also a time of serious economic 
depression.96 Defaults by debtors frequently caused ―credit cascades‖ as 
those to whom payment was due also became unable to pay their 
debts.97 These private debt collection problems and the economic hard-
ships they created were also associated in the mind of many with the 
problem of public debt and the inability or unwillingness of many states 
to pay their fair share of the debts incurred by the United States during 
the Revolutionary War.98 Moreover, these credit problems gave rise to 
serious civil unrest among agrarian debtors in various parts of the coun-
try, unrest that manifested itself most dramatically in Shays‘s Rebellion 
in western Massachusetts.99 
The states‘ legislative response to these issues was a matter of deep 
concern to Madison. He strongly condemned states that enacted ―tender 
laws‖ requiring creditors to accept paper money at face value in satis-
faction of debts.100 Recall also Madison‘s complaint about state laws 
that made ―property a legal tender‖ as one of the ways in which states 
were infringing on the rights of other states.101 In contrast, the most con-
 
 95 Of those, two involve efforts by Massachusetts creditors to enforce that state‘s strict (and to 
modern sensibilities somewhat strange) statute which provided that, under appropriate circums-
tances, attachment of a small personal item like a blanket or handkerchief of the out-of-state deb-
tor would subject the debtor to personal jurisdiction for the full amount of the claimed debt. See 
Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261, 261 
(Pa. 1788); Sachs, supra note 1, at 1236. 
  The two others represent attempts to give out-of-state effect to statutes passed in other 
states to give some protection to insolvent debtors within those states. See Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 
229, 261 (Pa. 1788); Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8, 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 
1784). They can all reasonably be seen as clashes in the battle Madison described between pro-
creditor and pro-debtor states. 
 96 Terry Bouton, Moneyless in Pennsylvania: Privatization and the Depression of the 1780s, 
in THE ECONOMY OF EARLY AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 218 
(Cathy Matson ed., 2006); Cathy Matson, The Revolution, The Constitution, and New Nation, in 1 
THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 363, 372–82 (Stanley L. Enger-
man & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1996). Paper money issued by states during the war rapidly dimi-
nished in value, trade with the West Indies had been disrupted, debts incurred during the war, 
both private and public were coming due, and American manufactures were being undercut by 
British imports and the economy generally was contracting. MANN, supra note 94, at 170–71; 
Matson, supra at 372–83. 
 97 MANN, supra note 94, at 19–20. 
 98 See Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 362. 
 99 MANN, supra note 94, at 180–81. Unrest among agrarian debtors was far from limited to 
Massachusetts. In 1787, Madison was informed by correspondents that ―much the same materials 
were on the verge of conflagration in the Old Dominion.‖ BANNING, supra note 15, at 122; see 
also WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 16, at 404; Robert A. Feer, Shay’s Rebellion and the 
Constitution, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388 (1969). 
 100 MANN, supra note 94, at 172–75. 
 101 In 1782, the Virginia Assembly passed a law permitting debts to be paid in hemp, tobacco, 
and flour, with the county courts determining their value. Slightly later legislation also permitted 
payment by title to land or slaves. A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN 
YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC 9/9/2011  6:08 PM 
2011] MADISON’S  FULL FAITH AND CREDIT  149 
sistently pro-creditor state was Massachusetts, where Boston merchants 
dominated the legislature and whose law required all taxes and private 
debts to be paid in specie.102 It also appears that litigation to recover 
debts was slow, expensive, and uncertain, casting disrepute on both the 
state courts and the lawyers who practiced before them.103 
States also potentially interfered with debt obligations in other 
states through insolvency and bankruptcy statutes. The three decades 
prior to the Constitutional Convention were a period of experimentation 
in many colonies (later states) concerning ―new statutory schemes for 
discharging debts as well as debtors.‖104 Although these statutes were 
generally ―short lived or restrictive in their application,‖105 they 
represented a growing tendency to view insolvency not as an individual 
moral failing but as an economic problem requiring a public re-
sponse.106 
Madison had long recognized the critical role that economic con-
cerns played in safeguarding the political and moral well-being of the 
nation.107 His temperament, his class, and his experience in the Virginia 
state legislature all inclined him against legislation that he perceived as 
designed to relieve citizens of their rightful obligations to their credi-
tors.108 It would be a mistake, however, to view the opposition of Madi-
son to tender laws and similar legislation as simply based on economic 
or class concerns. He saw them as fundamentally unfair and violations 
 
LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680–1810, at 171 (1981). 
 102 MANN, supra note 94, at 180. Feer makes the interesting observation that among Madison 
and other Federalists, Massachusetts was frequently cited as a model worthy of emulation, while 
Rhode Island (which in addition to being pro-debtor had not sent delegates to the Convention), 
was generally referred to with disdain. Feer, supra note 99, at 410. 
 103 MANN, supra note 94, at 20–24, 32–33. Mann also notes that while the actual legal process 
of enforcing and collecting debts changed little throughout the eighteenth century, states varied 
greatly in their attitudes toward debt collection and debtor relief. MANN, supra note 94, at 31–32. 
 104 MANN, supra note 94, at 55–77. 
 105 Id. at 55. 
 106 The state with the longest and most consistent policy of debtor relief was Rhode Island, 
which developed a system whereby debtors could discharge their debts (and avoid debtors‘ pris-
on) by petitioning the legislature. Peter J. Coleman, The Insolvent Debtor in Rhode Island 1745–
1828, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 413, 415–16 (1965). The petition was to be accompanied by a list of 
the all the debtors‘ assets. If the petition was granted (which was done by a special act of the leg-
islature) a commission, acting on the legislature‘s behalf, took the debtor‘s property and distri-
buted it pro-rata to his creditors. Id. at 415–16; see also Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 55 nn.102 & 
103 (description of Connecticut‘s laws regarding discharge of debtors). We have seen that the 
effect such discharges had on out-of-state creditors was the issue in two of the five reported cases 
under the Articles‘ clause. See James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786); Jenkins v. 
Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784). It was also to be an issue in 
the debates over the constitutional Clause. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 107 BANNING, supra note 15, at 48–49. 
 108 RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 54. He was quite pleased, for example, in having 
prevented the Virginia legislature from passing any bills providing for payment of debts with pa-
per money. BANNING, supra note 15, at 97–99. 
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of natural rights of contract and property.109 For Madison, the protection 
of property and contract rights was a basic principle of justice,110 which 
it was an obligation of a ―well constructed Union‖ to safeguard.111 But 
he also saw the protection of these rights not just as a benefit to the 
propertied classes, but as a necessary prerequisite for a stable economic 
system and, therefore, a safeguard of the nation‘s economic well be-
ing.112 Central to protecting such rights was a swift and fair system for 
the administration of justice. As Madison stated in 1788: 
Compare the situations of nations in Europe, where the justice is ad-
ministered with celerity, to that of those where it is refused, or admi-
nistered tardily. Confidence produces the best effects in the former. 
The establishment of confidence will raise the value of property, and 
relieve those who are so unhappy as to be involved in debts.113 
Madison at the start of the Constitutional Convention had a rather 
clear idea of the economic goals of the new federal system he was hop-
ing to create. It was one that would safeguard and enforce property 
rights in accordance with principles of natural justice and sound gover-
nance. Yet Madison was well aware that while such principles might 
represent ―fundamental law‖ in some theoretical sense, it was far from 
clear how such rights could be protected from short-sighted state legis-
lators, who had little regard for preservation of contract rights generally 
and even less for those of out-of-state creditors.114 His most basic an-
swer was a structural one, the creation of a larger federal government 
whose members would have a national perspective, and could thereby 
function as a disinterested ―umpire‖ between state interests.115 Since, on 
 
 109 See WOOD, THE CREATION, at 405–07. 
 110 See NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 28–29, 31–38. Much later in his 
life, Madison would described this property right in Lockean terms, stating, ―[t]he personal right 
to acquire property, which is a natural right, give to property, when acquired, a right to protection, 
as a social right.‖ James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2, 
1829), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 
1910). 
 111 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, su-
pra note 20, at 28–30. 
 112 NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 25–28, 40–42. 
 113 James Madison, Speech to Virginia Constitutional Convention on the Power of the Judi-
ciary (June 20, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 216, 225 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. 
Putnam‘s Sons 1904). Madison‘s precise topic was the Constitution‘s creation of federal diversity 
jurisdiction in Article III, but as usual, Madison saw the issue in broader terms. Id. at 217. 
 114 The problem of how to safeguard fundamental rights from legislative fiat was a central 
problem for eighteenth century American political thought. See WOOD, THE CREATION, supra 
note 16, at 273–82. Wood analyzes the problem as rooted in an ambiguity in the concept of law 
that existed among Americans of the period. See id. at 291–94. A ―confusion‖ existed between 
―the colonists‘ resort to written documents and charters as the best means of defending liberties‖ 
and an older conception of law as ―those rights which we are entitled to by the eternal laws of 
right reason.‖ Id. at 292–94. Madison certainly retained this older notion of fundamental law in 
his account of property and contract rights, and, as we will see, it also played a major role in the 
formation of the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
 115 Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 346. 
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Madison‘s view, the interests of the nation as a whole were always for 
the protection and fair and uniform enforcement of contract and proper-
ty rights, giving the federal government power to foster protection of 
such rights, and depriving states of the power to interfere with them, 
would be a major achievement. Not only did he expect the federal gov-
ernment to preserve these existing rights, including the obligation on the 
part of each state to enforce the debt obligations created in other states 
in accordance with their terms, but they could even be empowered to 
improve the efficiency and consistency with which those rights were en-
forced by providing for the execution of judgments obtained in one state 
in the courts of another.116 
 
D.     Full Faith and Credit and the Structure of the New Federal Union 
 
Although inconsistent debt enforcement was the practical problem 
Madison associated most closely with the constitutional Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, Madison did not view the Clause, or the relationship 
among states generally, solely from a narrow economic perspective. Ra-
ther it was part of a broader effort to foster ―harmony and proper inter-
course among the states.‖117 By the time of the Convention, Madison 
had developed fairly specific proposals to remedy the defects of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.118 To prevent the states from ―molesting‖ one 
another and other detrimental effects of ill-advised state laws, Madison 
proposed a simple but powerful solution—a federal ―negative,‖ a feder-
al veto power over any and all state legislation.119 An important justifi-
 
 116 See discussion infra Part II. 
 117 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 118 Banning comments that Madison was the ―best prepared of all who gathered for the Feder-
al Convention.‖ BANNING, supra note 15, at 115; see also WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 16, 
at 472. 
 119 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19 [18], 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 324, 327 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) [hereinafter Madi-
son, Letter to Jefferson]. While this may seem like a vast expansion of federal power relative to 
the states, Madison saw it as limited, defensive and necessary. In a letter to George Washington 
dated April 16, 1787, Madison laid out a vision of a newly created federal government whose 
positive lawmaking powers would only be expanded to ―all cases which require uniformity‖ such 
as regulation of foreign trade and naturalization, but which would have the power to exercise a 
negative ―in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the states, as heretofore exercised by 
the kingly prerogative.‖ Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 345 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
  Madison states this would be ―absolutely necessary‖ but also the ―least possible encroach-
ment on the State jurisdictions.‖ Id.; see also BANNING, supra note 15, at 117–18. Madison made 
similar arguments in a speech to the Constitutional Convention on June 8, 1787. 1 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 164 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 1 Farrand]. He 
reasoned that this was a merely ―defensive power‖ but one without which ―[t]he states will con-
tinue to invade the National jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations & harass each 
other with rival and spiteful measure . . . .‖ Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 345. 
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cation for this proposal was Madison‘s belief that the federal govern-
ment could function as a neutral arbiter among interests and factions, 
both within and among the states.120 Madison‘s concept of a ―federal 
negative‖ did not survive beyond the early weeks of the Constitutional 
Convention,121 but his vision of the federal government as a neutral ar-
biter among the states remained. 
The concerns of small states that they would be dominated by the 
larger ones developed into the central problem of the Convention.122 In 
his efforts to convince the smaller states that a large, proportionately-
based national government was in their own best interests, Madison ex-
panded on his idea of a federal government, with concurrent powers de-
rived from the people,123 as a neutral arbiter among states. Perhaps the 
most dramatic events of the Convention came on June 18 and 19, 1787, 
in response to the recently proposed ―New Jersey Plan.‖124 Alexander 
 
 120 As he stated in a letter to George Washington: 
The great desideratum which has not yet been found for Republican Governments 
seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different 
passions & interests in the State. The majority who alone have the right of decision, 
have frequently an interest, real or supposed in abusing it. In Monarchies the sovereign 
is more neutral to the interests and views of different parties; but unfortunately he too 
forms interests of his own repugnant to those of the whole. Might not the national pre-
rogative here suggested be found sufficiently disinterested for the decision of local 
questions of policy, whilst it would itself be sufficiently restrained from the pursuit of 
interests adverse to those of the whole Society. There has not been any moment since 
the peace at which the representatives of the Union would have given an assent to pa-
per money or any other measure of a kindred nature. 
Id. at 346–47. We see here a slight modification of Madison‘s argument for a large republic. Ra-
ther than simply argue that such a government will be too varied and diverse to be easily captured 
by any one faction, Madison here argues that the national government, by its very nature, will 
tend toward a neutral and positive role in resolving conflicts among factions and smaller political 
entities. As he says, a national government will be ―disinterested‖ on ―local questions of policy‖ 
and would therefore exercise a veto power only when it benefited the interests of ―the whole So-
ciety‖ such as to prevent his old bugaboo, the institution of paper money. See BANNING, supra 
note 15, at 141 (Madison recognized need to defend ―peaceable relations between the states from 
independent, countervailing state decision‖). 
 121 On June 8 and 9, 1787, a proposal to expand the power of the federal negative from state 
laws contravening the articles of union or treaties made under them to ―all laws which to them 
shall appear improper‖ was defeated, primarily by opposition of the smaller states. 1 Farrand, 
supra note 119, at 162–68. Madison‘s protestations notwithstanding, it seemed to most delegates 
an enormous and potentially unrestrained expansion of national power at the expense of the 
states, particularly the smaller states, and it certainly did not help that it was strongly reminiscent 
of a power previously exercised by the English monarch. 
 122 See BANNING, supra note 15, at 145–57; MILLER, supra note 16, at 67–73; RAKOVE, 
MADISON, supra note 17, at 65, 69. 
 123 A central organizing principle that developed in the early days of the Convention was that 
the powers of the national government should be derived from the people through an electoral 
process, not, as with the Articles, indirectly through the action of state governments. See 1 Far-
rand, supra note 119, at 21; see also BANNING, supra note 15, at 119. 
 124 The New Jersey Plan, proposed by Robert Paterson of New Jersey in opposition in to the 
Virginia Plan, basically called for an expanded version of the Articles of Confederation govern-
ment, with some expansion of federal powers, but preserving the one state–one vote rule for the 
national assembly. See BANNING, supra note 15, at 149. 
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Hamilton, giving his first significant speech of the Convention, argued, 
in effect, for the abolition of state sovereignty.125 
After Hamilton‘s radical proposal, Madison‘s remarks the follow-
ing day seem conciliatory and moderate. He focused again on the in-
adequacies of the current confederation, including its failure to prevent 
the ―trespasses of the states on each other,‖126 but warned that a failure 
of the Convention to preserve the union would result in far greater ca-
lamity to the smaller states, who would then be at the mercy of their 
larger neighbors.127 
Here again we see Madison‘s belief that a national government 
would have an ―equal interest‖ in protecting every part of the nation 
against every other. The argument may have backfired, however, with 
some delegates who interpreted it as meaning the national government 
would be indifferent to individual states and state boundaries, viewing 
them as ―mere counties‖ with few rights or interests of their own.128 
While this is a misreading of Madison‘s position, the element of truth in 
it is the association in Madison‘s mind of two concepts: the functioning 
of the states as administrative units of the national government and the 
national government‘s neutrality among those states.129 
These broader structural concerns underlie Madison‘s proposals for 
the specific language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and particular-
 
 125 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 283 (speech of Alexander Hamilton on June 18, 1787, stating 
he was ―fully convinced, that no amendment of the confederation, leaving the States in possession 
of their sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose [of the Convention]‖). Hamilton suggested 
that ―great economy‖ could be obtained by substituting a general government for those of the 
states, whose form might be maintained solely for the purpose of ―local‖ ―tribunals‖ and similar 
subordinate functions. Id. at 287; see also RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 68. 
 126 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 317. 
 127 If the union dissolved he asked, ―would the small States be more secure agst. the ambition 
& power of their larger neighbours, than they would be under a general Government pervading 
with equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part 
agst. every other part?‖ 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 320. 
 128 This is how Madison‘s remarks of June 28, 1787, were sometimes understood, as he argued 
again in defense of a proportionately elected national government: 
In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect incorpora-
tion, of the 13 States. In the first case they would be independent nations subject to no 
law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire re-
public, subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller states would have 
every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The true 
policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those principles & that form of 
Govt. which will most approximate the States to the condition of Counties. 
1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 449. Of course, Madison is speaking here of an ―extreme‖ position, 
not the one he was actually advocating. 
 129 The more states promote ―principles‖ which cause them to approximate ―the condition of 
Counties,‖ the more equally and neutrally state borders will be treated by the national government 
and the less they will have to fear from the larger states. Although Madison had not completely 
abandoned his hope for a federal negative on state legislation, he was relying more and more on 
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction to justify independent assertions of federal power and ex-
clude state participation in enforcement of federal laws. See 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 447; 
BANNING, supra note 15, at 155. 
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ly his insistence on the powers granted in the second sentence of the 
Clause, the part that made it an ―improvement‖ over the Articles‘ 
clause.130 This was not, as some have recently suggested, simply a mat-
ter of ―punting the ball‖ to the federal legislature in the face of some 
disagreement over the proper interpretation of legal terms.131 Rather, it 
was a grant of federal power designed by Madison and his allies to 
achieve very specific ends, the creation of far greater interstate defe-
rence obligations, such as interstate execution of judgments, than ex-
isted under current law or could appropriately be set forth as constitu-
tional mandates. Because a high degree of interstate deference, protec-
protection of vested property and contract rights from state interference, 
and a uniform and effective system for enforcement of such rights were 
all, in Madison‘s view, clearly in the national interest, a grant of power 
to the federal legislature to define and enforce the full faith and credit 
obligation would necessarily lead to a strengthening and expansion of 
that obligation.132 How Madison sought to draft the new Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to bring about such results is the subject of the next sec-
tion. 
 
II.     CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
CLAUSE 
A.     Sources of the Clause 
 
On July 24, 1787, the Constitutional Convention appointed a five-
man Committee of Detail to prepare a draft constitution that encom-
passed the results of deliberations up to that point.133 The Committee of 
Detail was chaired by John Rutledge of South Carolina, and also in-
cluded Edmund Randolph of Virginia, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachu-
setts.134 
There is no indication that any discussion of the full faith obliga-
tion took place at the Convention prior to that time, nor is it mentioned 
in the hotly debated proposals that became known as the Virginia and 
 
 130 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 131 See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1623–24. 
 132 See discussion supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. While historians still debate the 
extent to which Madison in 1787 sought to transform the United States into a cohesive national 
entity at the expense of the states, it is clear that he expected the new national government to 
make many changes to strengthen the national interest. See RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 
76–77. 
 133 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 97. 
 134 Id.; 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at xxii. 
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New Jersey Plans.135 Rather, it appears to have made its way to the 
Committee of Detail through the alternative proposal by Charles Pinck-
ney of South Carolina, who submitted a plan to the Convention on May 
29, 1787,136 which had a significant number of borrowings from the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, and which appears, based on notes and papers 
of James Wilson,137 to have been taken up and considered in the work of 
the Committee of Detail.138 
A version of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was in the draft con-
stitution submitted to the Convention by the Committee on Detail on 
August 6,139 although the Convention did not get around to discussing it 
until August 29.140 Given this delay, and the carefully drafted alternative 
proposals submitted on August 29, it seems likely that the draft was 
subject to substantial informal discussions by delegates in the three 
weeks prior to its formal consideration.141 
Proposed Article XVI of the draft stated, ―[f]ull faith shall be given 
in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judi-
 
 135 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 593–94, 611–16 (Max 
Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 3 Farrand]. 
 136 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 16. 
 137 A copy of what appears to have been the Pinckney Plan was found among James Wilson‘s 
papers relating to the work of the Committee on Detail. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 134–35, 134 
n.3. In its outline of proposed articles for the new constitution it included as point 3, ―Mutual In-
tercourse —Community of Privileges — Surrender of Criminals — Faith to Proceedings &c.‖ Id. 
at 135. These subjects, substantially elaborated, appear to have formed the basis for Articles XIII 
through XVI of the draft constitution presented by the Committee on Detail on August 6, 1787. 
See id. at 183–88. 
 138 Alexander Hamilton also submitted a constitutional plan on June 18, 1787, in conjunction 
with his controversial speech. The eleven points of that proposal and its variants do not mention a 
full faith and credit obligation. See VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION – TEXT. A, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ 
hamtexta.asp (last visited July 25, 2011); VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION – TEXT. B, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextb.asp (last visited July 25, 2011); VARIANT 
TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION – 
TEXT. C, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextc.asp (last visited July 25, 2011); 
VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION – TEXT. D, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextd.asp (last visited July 
25, 2011); VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION – TEXT. E, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtexte.asp (last 
visited July 25, 2011). However, an expanded version of Hamilton‘s plan, recorded in Madison‘s 
notes as ―communicated‖ to Madison by Colonel Hamilton, at ―about the close of the Convention 
in Philadelphia, 1787‖ does contain such a provision, Article IX, Section 5, which states in part: 
―full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceed-
ings of another.‖ See 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 617, 629. Given the timing and limitations on 
its distribution, it is hard to see how Hamilton‘s language could have influenced the drafting of 
the Clause at the Convention, except possibly indirectly through the comments of Madison him-
self. 
 139 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 176. 
 140 Id. at 445. 
 141 Engdahl makes a similar observation. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1622. 
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cial proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State.‖142 
The language is close, but not identical to, the full faith and credit 
clause in the Articles of Confederation.143 The major change is the ex-
tension of full faith not just to records and judicial proceedings but to 
―acts of the Legislatures.‖144 Moreover, the term ―full faith and credit‖ 
in the Articles has been abridged to ―full faith.‖ 
 
B.     Evidentiary vs. Substantive Deference and Beyond 
 
The discussion on August 29, 1787, began with a question by Wil-
liamson, a non-lawyer,145 who, apparently happy with the Articles‘ 
clause, wanted to know the meaning of the new proposed provision.146 
Wilson and Johnson, ―expert lawyers‖ both,147 replied in part that they 
―supposed the meaning to be that Judgments in one State should be the 
ground of actions in other States.‖148 This response, as prior commenta-
tors have noted, is almost as vague as the draft clause itself. It could be 
taken as a statement of a prima facie rule, a rule of substantive defe-
rence, or an indeterminate response vague enough to encompass ei-
ther.149 Wilson and Johnson‘s statement does indicate, however, that the 
Clause was assumed to require that out-of-state judgments be given 
 
 142 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 188. 
 143 Cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV. 
 144 The inclusion of records and judicial proceedings of ―magistrates‖ as well as courts may 
have represented another expansion. While magistrates were often lower level court officers, like 
justices of the peace, the eighteenth century term was also used to refer to high officers of the 
executive branch charged with carrying out the laws. In the constitutional debates themselves, the 
term ―chief magistrate‖ was often applied to the president and governors were also chief magi-
strates of their states. See WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 545–46 (1953). In any event, the term did not make it into 
the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
 145 Hugh Williamson of North Carolina was a physician with strong interests in the natural 
sciences. He was an ardent federalist, but had no legal training. See DELEGATES TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: HUGH WILLIAMSON, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/delegates/williamson.html (last visited July 26, 
2011). Accordingly, it seems likely that his question and suggestion to retain the wording of the 
Articles was not based on any strong attachment to the Articles‘ clause, but simply a reflection of 
his own curiosity (and seems to have been answered in that spirit). 
 146 The statement in Madison‘s notes is: ―Mr. Williamson moved to substitute in place of it, 
the words of the Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did (not) understand precisely 
the meaning of the article.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447. 
 147 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 56, 56 n.108. 
 148 Id. at 54 (quoting 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447). According to Madison‘s notes, Wilson 
and Johnson then added, ―& that acts of the Legislatures should be included, [as they sometime 
serve the like purpose as act] for the sake of Acts of insolvency &c —.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, 
at 447. The significance of the extension of the clause to legislative acts is discussed below. 
 149 Given the nature of the debate that developed on this issue on August 29, I think it most 
likely that Wilson and Johnson intended to tentatively suggest a rule of substantive deference, at 
least in some cases, while recognizing the uncertainties and complications of existing law. 
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some effect in actual litigation, and therefore excludes a purely formal 
evidentiary meaning. 
Although prior commentators have sought to find a basis for 
choosing between a prima facie and substantive interpretation of Wilson 
and Johnson‘s statement,150 a vaguely ambiguous response most accu-
rately reflected contemporary legal understandings.151 Wilson and John-
son‘s use of the verb ―supposed‖ is also interesting. It surely reflects, in 
part, these lawyers‘ recognition that the equivalent term in the Articles 
was uncertain and controversial, and thus, even expert lawyers could 
not state definitively what the term in the new Constitution would 
mean.152 
Yet the controversy that actually arose on August 29, 1787, did not 
involve choosing between a rule of prima facie or substantive deference, 
but a choice between two versions of substantive deference obligations, 
one static and one dynamic. The dynamic conception of the rule was 
Madison‘s. He declared himself in favor of committing to the Article, 
but presented the Convention with a vision of a more integrated and 
tightly coordinated legal system for enforcement of out-of-state judg-
ments. He ―wished the Legislature might be authorized to provide for 
the execution of Judgments in other States, under such regulations as 
might be expedient‖ and argued that this was ―justified by the nature of 
the Union.‖153 
 
 150 Whitten takes it as indicative of a non-conclusive (i.e., prima facie) rule. Whitten, State-
Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 549. He argues that since Wilson and Johnson viewed sister 
state judgments ―only as grounds for action,‖ not a conclusive basis for a judgment, their com-
ment is more consistent with a prima facie rule, while admitting his conclusion is open to doubt. 
Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Laycock, supra note 3, at 292 (referring to 
―Johnson‘s clear explanation‖). Engdahl argues that Wilson and Johnson‘s statement ―ought not 
to have troubled‖ those who understood the Clause as invoking only a prima facie rule, but ac-
knowledges that a rule of substantive deference was ―an arguable position‖ at this time and one 
that would ―excite concern‖ if applied to statutes. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1621. 
 151 It is surely possible that, in response to a question from a non-lawyer, Wilson and Johnson 
felt no need to expand upon the technical controversies that had arisen regarding the precise 
meaning of the Articles‘ Clause, especially since Williamson‘s question appears to have been 
directed primarily at the big change from the Articles‘ clause, the inclusion of ―acts of the legisla-
tures‖ under the full faith obligation. 
 152 It is also possible that Wilson and Johnson‘s statement (and perhaps even Williamson‘s 
seemingly naive question) had been prepared in advance to emphasize the indeterminate nature of 
both the Articles and proposed constitutional Clause. Note that the language of both alternative 
clauses proposed on August 29, Randolph‘s and Morris‘, provide different ways of dealing with 
the ambiguity of the Committee‘s proposed clause. 
 153 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448 (emphasis in original). The ―Union‖ being referred to, of 
course, was the new federal union being created by the Constitution, and its ―nature‖ was the Fe-
deralist principles on which that document was being created. Joseph Story made a similar argu-
ment in explaining why, in his view, substantive deference obligations were mandated by the 
constitutional Clause. Story based his explanation on the Founders‘ desire to ―form a more per-
fect Union; and to give to each state a higher security and confidence in the others . . . .‖ JOSEPH 
STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1303 (1833) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
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Note that Madison avoids the debate over the Articles‘ meaning to 
focus instead on what the obligation should be in the new federal union. 
We have seen that one of Madison‘s main goals at the Convention was 
to prevent states from interfering with one another‘s economic interests 
and that he hoped to do this, in part, by making the federal government 
a neutral arbiter between states, as part of a coordinated system for the 
protection and enforcement of property and contract rights.154 This also 
required the promotion of principles of administrative equality so that 
states would assume, at least for some purposes, the status of ―mere 
counties‖ in a larger federal union.155 Madison‘s proposal for interstate 
execution of judgments is an application of these general principles to 
the issue of state deference obligations for out-of-state judgments. It is a 
radical proposal,156 and Madison does not suggest it as the constitutional 
standard. Rather, he proposes it as a desirable policy goal that Congress 
might be ―authorized‖ to require in appropriate circumstances. What 
Madison was really proposing, therefore, was to authorize Congress to 
increase the interstate deference obligation well beyond any such obli-
gation that currently existed under the Articles‘ clause or the law of na-
tions.157 
It is doubtful Madison would have made such arguments if he did 
not believe that the majority of delegates agreed with his normative 
principle—that the new federal union coming into being justified, and 
perhaps even required, greater levels of deference for out-of-state judg-
ments.158 By focusing on what the rule should be, rather than what it 
 
 154 See discussion supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. As we have seen, Madison 
shared the general distaste of many at the Convention for the actions of state legislatures and the 
character of many of the men elected to them, which he saw as frequently trespassing on the 
rights of minorities as well as the rights and interests of other states. See WOOD, THE CREATION, 
supra note 16, at 476–83; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (defending the pro-
hibition on ex post facto laws, bills of attainder and impairment of contracts). 
 155 See discussion supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. 
 156 Yet it was not completely beyond the contemplation of contemporary judges construing the 
full faith and credit obligation. In James v. Allen, counsel for defendant had argued that the Ar-
ticles‘ clause ratcheted up the deference obligation created under the law of nations, ―if a Judg-
ment . . . had not been evidence before, this provision . . . would have made it so—if it was only 
prima facie evidence before, this would render it conclusive.‖ 1 Dall. 188, 190 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1786). The judge rejects this argument, stating, ―[t]he Articles of Confederation . . . will not admit 
of the construction contended for, otherwise executions might issue in one State upon the judg-
ments given in another . . . .‖ Id. at 191–92. Since Judge Shippen believes the law of nations al-
ready requires substantive deference to foreign judgments in at least some cases, he is assuming 
that the only higher level of deference for such judgments would be a rule of execution, an absurd 
result under the Articles‘ clause. 
 157 It is surely not a coincidence that Gouveneur Morris, in that same discussion, proposed an 
alternative draft to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which contained just such authorizing lan-
guage. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448. 
 158 A connection of this sort is suggested by the argument of Jared Ingersoll in Phelps v. Holk-
er. 1 Dall. 261, 261 (Pa. 1788). Ingersoll, a delegate to the Convention, see MANN, supra note 94, 
at 184, represented the plaintiff in Phelps and argued for a substantive deference interpretation of 
the Articles‘ clause shortly after the Convention had ended. He noted that 
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was, Madison avoided arguments over the vague and ―extremely inde-
terminate‖ language of the Articles‘ clause.159 Yet rather than clarify the 
precise parameters of the rule, Madison sought to use the vagueness to 
justify a broad grant of power to the federal legislature to define and en-
force a stronger deference obligation. We have seen that Madison was 
willing to give the federal government power to curb improper or un-
wise state legislative action through a federal veto.160 This proposal 
created a more limited federal power to constrain states‘ refusals to en-
force out-of-state judgments. 
Moreover, giving power to Congress to define and expand the full 
faith and credit obligation obviated any need to clarify or resolve the ra-
refied prima facie rule–substantive deference controversy in the Consti-
tution itself. Madison had a number of good reasons not to clarify the 
language in the constitutional text. First, clearly defining the constitu-
tional language—even as a rule of substantive deference—would make 
it harder, if not impossible, to later impose the execution rule that Madi-
son really wanted.161 Second, Madison was always concerned that any 
clear and limited statement of rights provided opportunities for evasion 
by the unscrupulous (in this case, state legislatures).162 Moreover, in the 
political debates regarding ratification of the Constitution, Madison 
liked to argue (and may even have believed) that the Constitution did 
not grant many new powers to the federal government, but merely pro-
vided for more effective use of the powers granted under the Articles.163 
Retaining virtually identical language from the Articles‘ clause for the 
first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided support for 
such a position.164 Finally, the grant of power to Congress obviated any 
 
[t]his then is a Union of which no precendent [sic] is to be found in any other part of 
the globe . . . and its design must certainly have been to form a stronger cement, than 
that by which the States themselves were hitherto connected, or by which they are, at 
this day, connected with other nations. . . . [I]f it is admitted that by this article, the au-
thors of the system intended to make a Judgment in New Jersey as binding in Pennsyl-
vania, as if it had been obtained in any County of this State, no other form of words, or 
mode of expression, could have been selected more clearly to convey that intention. 
Phelps, 1 Dall. at 263. While admittedly an argument about the Articles‘ clause, it is easy to see 
how Ingersoll‘s references to the ―stronger cement‖ now binding the states together and the anal-
ogy of states to counties reflect the broader federalist themes of the Convention and the belief that 
they require rules of substantive deference. 
 159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 160 See discussion supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text. 
 161 Indeed, that seems to have been one of the main purposes of Randolph‘s alternative pro-
posal. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 162 See, e.g., 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 440 (―Evasions might and would be devised [to the 
Contract Clause] by the ingenuity of the Legislatures—‖); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 
(James Madison) (discussing the problem of enumeration of the powers granted by the necessary 
and proper clause). 
 163 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
 164 BANNING, supra note 15, at 162 (―Madison repeatedly insisted that the Constitution should 
be understood less as a grant of new authority than as a means of rendering effective the powers 
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need to clarify the ―full faith and credit‖ language. If the courts con-
struing that language interpreted it as mandating a rule of substantive 
deference, that would be fine, but if not, the federal legislature would be 
clearly empowered to enact such a rule as a matter of statute.165 
The existence of a normative consensus among the drafters in fa-
vor of a rule of substantive deference is borne out by the response to 
Madison‘s proposal by his Virginia colleague Edmund Randolph, 
another experienced and highly esteemed attorney.166 Randolph had no 
problem with a rule of substantive deference, but was repelled by Madi-
son‘s radical proposal for execution of sister state judgments, stating 
that ―there was no instance of one nation executing judgments of the 
Courts of another nation.‖167 Randolph then presented to the Convention 
an alternative clause that laid out, in clear and precise detail, the full 
faith obligations states would have toward one another. It provided for 
both an evidentiary rule and a rule of substantive deference, making all 
state acts, ―whether legislative executive or judiciary[,] . . . binding in 
every other State, in all cases to which it may relate,‖168 with appropri-
ate lawyerly caveats about jurisdiction and similar matters.169 
 
that the central government had always had (at least on paper).‖). One can imagine Madison be-
lieving that the confused and indeterminate case law decided under the Articles‘ clause was simp-
ly another instance of states‘ failing to carry out the mandate of the Articles‘ which should have 
given rise to a rule of substantive deference required by a coordinated union of states, and that the 
constitutional Clause was simply a means of correcting that mistake. This is very close to the ac-
count Justice Story gives, in which the ―amendment in the Constitution‖ (which Story believed 
mandated a rule of substantive deference) was, ―without question, designed to cure the defects in 
the existing provision.‖ STORY, supra note 153, at § 1302. 
 165 Given Madison‘s concern over the capacities and political effectiveness of the courts, see 
discussion infra Part III, it is likely he anticipated such a definitive rule might have to be set forth 
by Congress. 
 166 George Washington appointed him the first Attorney General of the United States in 1789. 
See USDOJ, EDMUND JENNINGS RANDOLPH, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=0 
(last visited July 26, 2011). 
 167 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448. 
 168 Id. at 445. The full text of the proposal reads: 
Whensoever the act of any State, whether legislative executive or judiciary shall be at-
tested and exemplified under the seal thereof, such attestation and exemplification shall 
be deemed in other State as full proof of the existence of that act—and it‘s operation 
shall be binding in every other State, in all cases to which it may relate, and which are 
within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State, wherein the said act was done. 
Id. 
 169 Legal scholars then (and now) recognize that any rule of substantive deference for judicial 
or other state acts must be limited to circumstances where the state has valid power to act. See 
Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); see also Laycock, supra note 3, at 
298. The critical question is what determines such a finding of so-called ―judicial jurisdiction.‖ 
James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for 
Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 177–78 (2004) [hereinafter Weinstein, Federal Common 
Law]. On this point, Randolph‘s proposed amendment‘s conclusory reference to ―cognizance and 
jurisdiction‖ might itself seem somewhat vague. Professor Weinstein, however, has argued that 
by the time of the Founding, there was already a fairly clear conception of the territorial compe-
tence of courts under international law. See James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Con-
ception of Judicial Jurisdiction in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 83–84 (1990) 
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Randolph‘s comment on Madison‘s proposal for sister-state execu-
tion of judgments suggests that Randolph‘s proposal was designed to be 
a more conservative, less controversial one, more in keeping with the 
law of nations.170 The substance of Randolph‘s proposal shows that it 
was designed to clarify and delineate the obligations of states toward 
one another in the new federal union, while preventing any drift or de-
velopment toward further integration.171 It is surely indicative of the 
general attitude of the Founders toward the full faith obligation that 
even this conservative response to Madison‘s proposal contained a rule 
of substantive deference.172 
In short, a fair reading of the notes of the August 29 meeting re-
veals that the primary dispute was not between proponents of an eviden-
tiary reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and proponents of a 
rule of substantive deference. Rather, it was between proponents of a 
precisely delineated, lawyerly coherent, and static clause that would 
create and maintain a relatively clear set of obligations of deference be-
tween the states,173 and a looser, vaguer, less clearly defined statement 
of those same obligations, whose content could be clarified and streng-
thened by subsequent acts of the national legislature.174 
 
[hereinafter Weinstein, Dutch Influence]. Randolph‘s comments at the Convention on August 29, 
1787, can be read as implying that his proposed language, unlike that of Morris, was limited to 
what was in conformance to the law of nations. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447. 
 170 See discussion infra notes 221–222 and accompanying text. 
 171 Most significantly, Randolph‘s proposal makes no provision for further elaboration of the 
deference obligation through federal lawmaking. While the clause, to modern eyes, seems to con-
tain significant ambiguity in its limitation of the ―binding‖ operation of an out-of-state act to ―all 
cases to which it may relate, and which are within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State,‖ 2 
Farrand, supra note 1, at 448, it seems probable that Randolph believed the existing law of na-
tions supplied the necessary jurisdictional rules. See Weinstein, Dutch Influence, supra note 169, 
at 90 n.77. It also seems clear, based on his comments at the Convention, that Randolph, unlike 
Madison, did not believe that the federal legislature could or should be empowered to create a 
deference obligation greater than that required under the law of nations. 
 172 Although Whitten tries to argue even here that the rule is not as conclusive as it appears, 
his argument here is much weaker and the word ―binding‖ is fairly dispositive. See Whitten, 
FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 289–92. Engdahl agrees that Randolph‘s proposal contained 
a rule of substantive deference. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1623. 
 173 The Extradition and Fugitive Slave Clauses, which were approved by the Convention on 
August 28 and 29, 1787, the same session in which the Full Faith and Credit Clause was being 
considered, also impose obligations on states to defer to determinations of sister states. 2 Farrand, 
supra note 1, at 443, 453–54. Both were later incorporated into Article IV of the Constitution. See 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, 3. Indeed, they can be viewed as additional rules of substantive 
deference, since in both instances one state‘s determination of a person‘s legal status, as a felon or 
escaped slave, was made binding on all other states. In these clauses, however, there is no ambi-
guity regarding the states‘ obligations and no grant of federal power to define or enforce it. It 
seems clear that in these instances, unlike the broader obligations of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the Founders wished to create precise and immutable rules of state conduct governing 
specific circumstances (to their eternal discredit with regard to fugitive slaves). 
 174 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 445, 447–48. Randolph had rejected Madison‘s vision as im-
possible under the law of nations. For Madison, however, that was precisely the point. States 
would no longer relate to each other as independent nations with separate judicial systems, but as 
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That was the meaning and intent of the alternative proposal then 
submitted to the Convention by Gouverneur Morris,175 which stated: 
―[f]ull faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records, 
and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Legislature shall 
by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts, records, 
and proceedings.‖176 
Accordingly, the two new proposals by Randolph and Morris, both 
probably drafted before the meeting on August 29, defined the poles of 
the debate regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause.177 It was not a de-
bate between a prima facie rule and a rule of substantive deference. It 
was a debate between static and dynamic conceptions of the full faith 
obligation, but it was even more than that. It was a debate between two 
styles of constitutional rulemaking, two ways to deal with broad, poten-
tially ambiguous rules. One response, that of Randolph, was to define 
and clarify the obligations being created as explicitly as possible.178 The 
other, that of Morris and Madison, was to provide an authority for re-
solving such ambiguities as they arose. 
 
C.     Full Faith and Credit for Legislative Acts 
 
The most striking change between the Articles‘ clause and the draft 
proposed on August 6, 1787, was the extension of the full faith obliga-
tion to ―acts of the Legislatures.‖179 The reasons for this change are 
 
parts of a coordinated federal union, whose state governments would relate to each other, if not as 
―mere counties,‖ at least as subordinate parts of a larger federal union, which could prescribe 
rules of deference to out-of-state actions which were in the interests of the nation as a whole. To 
do this, one needed a looser, vaguer, less precise rule of substantive deference, with a grant of 
power to the federal government to prescribe the precise form that deference would take as time 
and circumstances warranted. 
 175 Id. at 448. 
 176 Id. (quotations omitted). 
 177 Id. at 445, 448. 
 178 Id. at 445. The advantages and disadvantages of stating legal norms as clear and precisely 
defined ―rules‖ rather than vague but more flexible ―standards‖ has been extensively analyzed in 
modern law reviews by commentators of many different political and methodological persua-
sions. See e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules and Social Norms, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 101 (1997); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
379 (1985). The assumption of this literature that the form in which a norm is stated may reflect 
the underlying policy concerns of the drafter certainly seems to apply to the competing proposals 
of Randolph and Morris/Madison. 
 179 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V; 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 188. It is 
possible to read the Articles‘ clause as including statutes, if the term ―Acts‖ is read broadly to 
include legislative acts and the phrase ―of the courts and magistrates‖ as modifying only ―judicial 
proceedings.‖ Yet this view is ―questionable‖ at best. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1620. It is also 
hard to reconcile such a reading with Wilson and Johnson‘s comment that the legislative acts 
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even more obscure than usual because our primary source of informa-
tion about such matters, Madison‘s notes, are not only sparse, but 
somewhat ambiguous due to Madison‘s own redaction. Madison rec-
orded Wilson and Johnson‘s explanation that ―acts of the Legislatures 
should be included, [as they sometime serve the like purpose as act] for 
the sake of Acts of insolvency &c—.‖180 
Some scholars, noting that the line makes sense as written, ignore 
the redaction and assume that the purposes of the inclusion of legislative 
acts was primarily to insure deference to the relatively narrow class of 
legislative actions that function like adjudications, particularly insol-
vency statutes.181 There are, however, significant problems with that as-
sumption. First, Madison presumably deleted the phrase because he felt 
it was incorrect or misleading in some way. While it seems clear that 
state acts of insolvency were discussed (and Madison leaves the refer-
ence to such acts intact), he deletes the idea that they were included be-
cause they were viewed as similar in purpose to adjudication. At the 
very least, this should cast doubt on any explanation of inclusion of leg-
islative acts in the clause that relies too heavily on that analogy. 
Moreover, the clause itself was not limited to acts of the legislature 
that functioned like judgments, or acts relating to insolvency.182 Quite 
the contrary, it initially extended to all ―Acts of the legislatures‖ and 
was narrowed, in Morris‘ proposed draft of August 29, to ―public acts,‖ 
expressly excluding the private legislative acts most likely to function 
like judgments.183 Finally, this discussion of full faith and credit in con-
nection with acts of insolvency was immediately followed by a proposal 
from Charles Pinckney to give the federal government power to ―estab-
lish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies.‖184 It seems clear 
that something led the delegates to perceive a substantial connection be-
tween the desirability of a federal bankruptcy power and the ―interstate 
problems of full faith in the field of insolvency.‖185 
 
were included in the constitutional Clause for the sake of acts of insolvency. See id. at 1622 n.181 
 180 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447, 447 n.3. Bracketed words are crossed out, but legible, in 
the original. Id. 
 181 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 53–55. These acts functioned like court judgments because 
they purported to discharge claims against particular individuals, much as a verdict for defendant 
would. See argument of defendant in James v. Allen, discussed supra at note 68. 
 182 It appears that the use of legislative acts to provide insolvency relief was not a very wide-
spread practice. Mann tells us that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, Connecticut was 
the only state that ―granted insolvency relief by legislative act rather than judicial decree.‖ MANN, 
supra note 94, at 183. 
 183 Crosskey argues that the exclusion of private acts from the operation of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and the limitation of the bankruptcy power to ―uniform laws‖ shows that the Fra-
mers‘ reaction to these laws was strongly negative. CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 544–45. 
 184 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 445. 
 185 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 57. 
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In short, we can infer that on or before August 29, 1787, there were 
discussions186 concerning extending interstate deference to statutes and 
acts of insolvency which (1) did not primarily rely on the argument that 
insolvency acts served the same purpose as judgments; and (2) inclined 
the Convention to support a federal power to establish uniform bank-
ruptcy laws. It may also be noteworthy that such discussions would 
have taken place contemporaneously with the Convention‘s considera-
tion and tentative approval of a number of measures designed to prevent 
state legislative interference with contract and property rights.187 
It is likely that any such discussion involved some consideration of 
the recently decided case of James v. Allen,188 and more generally of the 
obligation under the law of nations to recognize, and in certain circums-
tances to apply, the statutes of foreign states.189 It also helps explain 
why the extension of the full faith obligation to statutes, which has puz-
zled many later scholars,190 might not have appeared as significant or as 
surprising to lawyers at the time.191 
In James,192 as previously noted,193 Judge Shippen recognized, in 
dicta, an obligation by courts in some circumstances to recognize and 
apply the legislative acts of foreign countries,194 particularly statutes re-
 
 186 By ―discussion‖ I do not necessarily mean that all these issues were aired in unrecorded 
debates before the Convention itself. It is possible that many of these ideas were discussed infor-
mally by groups of delegates off the floor or during recesses, leaving us with the somewhat cryp-
tic account of just the formal actions taken. 
 187 The Convention had just approved an absolute prohibition on state laws providing for 
payment of debts in anything but specie, seeing in the words of one of its sponsors ―a favorable 
crisis for crushing paper money,‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 439 (statement of Roger Sherman), 
and also approved the Contract Clause, which Madison had somewhat ambivalently supported, 
while commenting that, ―[e]vasions might and would be devised by the ingenuity of the [state] 
Legislatures.‖ Id. at 440. The history of the Contract Clause is obscure, and Madison‘s initial 
support for it was ambivalent.
 
See John W. Ely, Jr., Origins and Development of the Contract 
Clause 3–8 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law Research Paper No. 05–36, 2005), available at SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=839904. Madison ―admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a 
prohibition but thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by the utility of it.‖ 2 Farrand, su-
pra note 1, at 440. In Federalist 44, however, he describes laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts as ―contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound 
legislation.‖ THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). 
 188 See discussion supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 189 Not only was it the only reported case at that time involving both insolvency statutes and 
full faith and credit obligations, but one of the lawyers who argued it, Jared Ingersoll, was a 
member of the Pennsylvania delegation to the Convention along with James Wilson. See MANN, 
supra note 94, at 184. 
 190 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1622–23; Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 73; Whitten, 
State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 544. 
 191 Engdahl, for example, observes that extension of the full faith obligation to statutes was 
such an ―unsettling‖ prospect, that Williamson‘s ―temperate response‖ is somewhat surprising. 
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1622. Note: From context, the article‘s reference to ―Dr. Wilkinson‖ 
appears to be a typographical error, and that the author intended to refer to Dr. Williamson. Id. 
 192 James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786). 
 193 See discussion supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 194 Judge Shippen wrote, 
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lating to contract rights.195 The reference to ―foreign countries‖ makes it 
clear that Judge Shippen found the source of this obligation not under 
the Articles‘ clause but pursuant to the law of nations.196 There is gener-
al agreement among scholars that by the late eighteenth century, choice 
of law rules were seen as part of the law of nations, which had been in-
corporated into English and thereafter American law.197 Under the then-
prevailing ―unilateralist‖ approach to conflict of laws, a single body of 
doctrine derived primarily from concepts of international comity and 
vested rights determined the law that would be applied to disputes with 
 
And not only the decisions of Courts, but even the Laws of foreign countries, where no 
suits have been instituted, would in some cases be taken notice of here; where such 
laws are explanatory of the contracts, and appear to have been in the contemplation of 
the parties at the time of making them; as if the interest of money should be higher in a 
foreign country where the contract was made, than in that where the suit was brought, 
the foreign interest shall be recovered, as being understood to be part of the contract. 
1 Dall. at 191. 
 195 Mann explains the significance of statutory interest in the enforcement of debt instruments. 
MANN, supra note 94, at 12. Critically, Judge Shippen is making these comments and applying 
these doctrines under the Articles‘ clause, which contained no full faith obligation for legislative 
acts. Accordingly the idea that foreign statutes should be given extraterritorial effect in appropri-
ate cases was already an accepted concept in 1787, not an innovation of the Founders. 
 196 Although Judge Shippen cites no authority in support of his statements, he quite possibly 
had in mind Lord Mansfield‘s statement in Robinson v. Bland, which stated: ―The general rule, 
established ex comitate et jure gentium, is that the place where the contract is made, and not 
where the action is brought, is to be considered in expounding and enforcing the contract.‖ (1790) 
96 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.N.) 142 (quote not reported in case, see Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional 
Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 808, 808 n.125 (1955)). Rheinstein notes that the 
reported citations to the argument by the attorneys for the debtor in James v. Allen, make refer-
ence to ―those pages of Blackstone‘s and Burrow‘s Reports on which Robinson v. Bland is re-
ported.‖ Rheinstein, supra at 808. A similar statement of the law can be found in John Marshall‘s 
1788 explanation to the Virginia Constitutional Convention that suits in Virginia on contracts 
made in Maryland must apply the interest specified by the law of Maryland, but he states this rule 
as a ―principle in the jurisprudence of this commonwealth,‖ without mentioning the law of na-
tions. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556–57 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1831) [hereinafter 3 Elliot]. 
 197 See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 594 
(2003) (―Modern scholars agree that in the absence of statutory overrides, members of the found-
ing generation expected the necessary choice-of-law rules to come from the general law of na-
tions—a body of rules that (they believed) could be derived from the dictates of reason and from 
common consent manifested by international custom.‖ (citations omitted)). This line of argument 
was first developed by Max Rheinstein and William Crosskey, who argued that the constitutional 
Full Faith and Credit Clause was meant to incorporate conflict of laws concepts that were per-
ceived as part of the ius gentium (law of nations) at the time. CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 550; 
Rheinstein, supra note 196, at 808–12. While Crosskey argues that the first sentence of the con-
stitutional Clause was intended to incorporate contemporary choice of law doctrine, CROSSKEY, 
supra note 144, at 550, Rheinstein is a little more tentative, saying only that given the ―widely 
held opinion‖ among lawyers that the law of nations determined these issues, it is ―no wonder‖ 
that the constitutional Clause was seen as creating obligations no greater than the law of nations. 
Rheinstein, supra note 196, at 808–09. Whitten takes issue with these claims, arguing that it is 
―textually unnatural,‖ and not a good fit with the ―preconstitutional context,‖ yet concedes that it 
is a ―plausible reading.‖ Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 546 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
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multistate aspects.198 Statutes providing for payment of interest could be 
enforced extraterritorially since they formed part of the rights vested 
under the contract created in that state.199 Significantly, in light of con-
temporary concerns, marriage was the other contractual relationship in 
which the eighteenth-century law of nations clearly stated that the rights 
of the parties were determined by the law of the place where the mar-
riage took place.200 
Although all scholars agree that the law of nations was part of 
American law at the time of the Founding,201 they disagree over the ex-
tent to which that law was incorporated into the full faith and credit 
clauses of the Articles and of the Constitution. Indeed, the indetermina-
cy previously discussed concerning the Articles‘ clause can be seen as 
 
 198 According to historians of conflict of laws, the eighteenth century was the period when 
English common law courts began to recognize an ius gentium or law of nations, which was con-
ceived as part of English law, enforceable in its courts. The rules governing such choice of law 
issues were derived from continental sources, primarily Ulrich Huber. Huber spoke of rights be-
ing acquired within a foreign territory, which rights were defined by the law of that place and 
then given effect in a domestic tribunal. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER 
L. REV. 419, 441 (1984); Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 
AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 306–08 (1953); see also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, 
13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 (1918) (an English translation of Huber‘s De Conflictu Legum is pro-
vided in the article‘s appendix, id. at 401–18). This concept of vested rights not only underlay the 
judge‘s comments in James v. Hall, but the general attitude of Madison and other framers toward 
property rights as well. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 199 Madison clearly favored such rules as necessary for the preservation and effective en-
forcement of property rights. See discussion supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. Madison 
envisioned a system whereby judgments obtained in one state could be swiftly executed in anoth-
er. An even more fundamental requirement, however, was that debts incurred in one state be en-
forced, in accordance with their terms, in another. Yet as Judge Shippen noted, the failure of one 
state‘s courts to give effect to the interest statutes in the state where the contract was made could 
devalue that debt just as effectively as the use of paper money. See James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 
191 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786). Moreover, a statute lowering or abolishing the interest to be paid on 
foreign incurred debts is just the kind of ploy that might be attempted by ingenious state legisla-
tures, unless blocked by a clear statement that such foreign statutes were subject to a full faith and 
credit obligation. 
 200 See Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum, translated in 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 401, 401–11 
(Ernest G. Lorenzen trans., 1918); Rheinstein, supra note 196, at 807 n.124; Alexander N. Sack, 
Conflicts of Law in the History of English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935 
342, 441, 449 (1937). 
 201 This same concept of the law of nations was being used in American courts at the time of 
the Founding to deny full faith and credit to judgments entered by foreign courts, which were 
perceived as unable to create such vested rights. Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1786), discussed supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text, was the first American case that held 
that judgments rendered without personal service on defendant within the state were not enforce-
able in other states. While the decision cites no authority, Weinstein has argued that the concept 
that a court lacks power to adjudicate with regard to a defendant not found in its territory and that 
such judgments should be denied extraterritorial effect is a concept that can be found in Huber, 
and very likely known to judges in the post-revolutionary period. See Weinstein, Dutch Influence, 
supra note 169, at 79–85; see also Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fun-
damental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 860–61 (1978) (Amer-
ican concept of unwritten fundamental law founded on ―systematic treatises on the law of nature 
and nations‖). 
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uncertainty over precisely this issue.202 With regard to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, however, the record of the Convention debates strongly 
suggests that the delegates viewed the deference obligations created by 
the law of nations as at least a minimum statement of the interstate defe-
rence obligations created by the Clause, with the debate focusing on 
how and to what extent those minimums should be exceeded.203 It is al-
so very likely that Madison and his colleagues believed that certain ba-
sic principles of the law of nations constituted fundamental rules based 
on ―rules of conduct which reason deduces,‖204 which could not be al-
tered by statute.205 
Insolvency statutes, however, were a relatively new type of legisla-
tion whose extraterritorial effects under the law of nations were far from 
clear. In James, Judge Shippen avoided this issue206 by finding that the 
 
 202 Advocates of a purely evidentiary ―authentication‖ reading of the Clause believe it did not 
incorporate any rules of the law of nations regarding the effects of foreign judgments (although 
such rules might then be applied by courts to the authenticated judgments). See Sachs, supra note 
1, at 1226; Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 546. Advocates of a prima facie 
rule argued that the Clause embodies the preexisting English understanding of the law of nations 
on the subject, see Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1597–99, and advocates of substantive deference 
believed that the Clause required that the deference obligation among states to be something 
greater than the law of nations. 
 203 Wilson and Johnson‘s statement that the Clause made out-of-state judgments ―grounds of 
actions‖ reflects, at least, the prima facie rule Lord Mansfield derived from the law of nations. 
Randolph‘s comment that Madison‘s proposed execution rule was ―unheard of‖ among nations 
and his alternative proposal of a rule of substantive deference surrounded by jurisdictional restric-
tions indicates his view that the Clause should go to the outer limits of current understandings of 
the law of nations, but no further. Wilson‘s comment that, without a Congressional right to dec-
lare the effect of sister state statutes the Clause will amount to no more than the rules currently 
existing among independent nations indicates his view that interstate deference obligations under 
the Clause should exceed those under the law of nations. 
 204 James Madison, An Examination of the British Doctrine Which Subjects to Capture a Neu-
tral Trade Not Open in Time of Peace (1806), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 204, 238 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1908) (1787) (stating that the law of nations encompasses 
―those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice and common good, from 
the nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifica-
tions as may be established by general consent‖). 
 205 See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1137–38. Sherry shows that for lawyers of the Founders‘ 
generation, the law of nations, or at least its most fundamental principles, was a well established 
part of a higher or more fundamental law with incorporated principles of the ―law of nature‖ and 
―universal society‖ and which could be used to strike down validly enacted statutes which were 
contrary to its principles. Id. at 1137–39. This is also consistent with Gordon Wood‘s observation 
that there was a ―confusion‖ in the post-revolutionary period between indefeasible rights based on 
the ―eternal laws of right reason‖ and ―written charters‖ as safeguards of those rights. WOOD, 
THE CREATION, supra note 16, at 273–82. See generally Grey, supra note 200. 
 206 In James v. Allen, the defendant argued that his discharge under the New Jersey insolvency 
act ―so far as regards the imprisonment or detention as his person‖ was, in effect, an adjudication 
of the same debt sued on in Pennsylvania and should be applied to bar that suit. 1 Dall. 188, 189 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786). In making that case, lawyers for the defendant argued that proceedings 
under the [New Jersey] Insolvent Act ―amount to a judicial decision; for, they determine a debt, 
and give a remedy.‖ Id. Note the similarity to Madison‘s stricken statement regarding the ―like 
purpose‖ of insolvency acts and adjudications. If this is the argument Madison was recollecting, 
the strikethrough makes perfect sense, since it was an argument rejected explicitly in James v. 
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New Jersey statute ―is a private act, made for that particular purpose; it 
is local in its nature, and local in its terms.‖207 Delegates could reasona-
bly anticipate, however, that additional cases would arise based on 
broader insolvency acts that clearly purported to discharge out-of-state 
debts.208 If the law of nations gave extraterritorial effect to a foreign sta-
tute creating contractual rights, what about a foreign statute extinguish-
ing such rights? 
Unlike the statutory debtor relief provisions Madison so adamantly 
opposed, which enabled all debtors to discharge their debts for a frac-
tion of their value, a well-drafted and -administered general bankruptcy 
law would apply only to the more limited class of debtors who were ac-
tually insolvent and would ensure that all creditors were treated equita-
bly. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the popular conception of 
debt was changing from a moral failing to an economic one.209 Dis-
charge of debts through bankruptcy was increasingly seen as a relatively 
efficient and effective alternative to debtors‘ prison.210 Madison‘s views 
were certainly in line with this new thinking. His concerns were always 
with the economic effects of paper tender laws and other impairments of 
contract. Bankruptcy laws, he recognized, could be an important part of 
the regulation of commerce, benefiting creditors as well as debtors.211 
Although these were important considerations inclining the drafters to 
include bankruptcy statutes in the full faith obligation, probably the 
most important consideration was the economic harm likely to ensue if 
states could exclude their creditors from the operation of other state‘s 
bankruptcy laws. 
What emerged from the Convention on this question may be seen 
as a tentative and limited endorsement of the state legislatures‘ powers 
to safeguard its debtors through bankruptcy laws. The full faith obliga-
tion would be extended to all ―public acts‖ of the state legislatures, im-
plicitly endorsing the holding of James and discouraging other private 
laws meant to benefit specific individuals. While the law of nations 
might provide some guidance as to when bankruptcy discharges pur-
suant to these statutes are to be given extraterritorial effect, the federal 
government was empowered to act as a neutral arbiter to prescribe the 
extraterritorial effects of such statutes. And, if the whole structure 
 
Allen and implicitly by the Full Faith and Credit Clause limitation to ―public acts.‖ 
 207 Id. at 191. 
 208 It is likely many delegates knew of the pending case of Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 
1788), which Jared Ingersoll was then preparing to argue. MANN, supra note 94, at 184. That case 
involved the extra-territorial effect of a discharge under the Maryland insolvency act, which the 
court later described as a ―general bankrupt law‖ which purported to discharge all claims against 
the debtor. 
 209 See generally id. 
 210 See, e.g., Millar, 1 Dall. at 231. 
 211 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
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proved too unwieldy or corrupt, the federal government had the power 
to supplant the whole thing with uniform federal laws. 
 
D.     Mandatory and Discretionary Power Under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause 
 
When the Committee on Detail issued its revised version of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause on September 1, 1787, it accepted the basic 
framework of the Madison-Morris proposal of the week before.212 The 
first sentence contained a broad, vague obligation on each state to give 
―full faith and credit‖ to ―public acts, records and judicial proceedings‖ 
of the other states.213 The second sentence gave the federal government 
power to prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceed-
ings could be proved, but significantly limited the federal government‘s 
power to prescribe the effects of one state‘s actions in another state to 
―judgments,‖ thereby depriving the federal government of the power to 
prescribe the effects of state legislative acts in other states.214 This mod-
ification of Morris‘s original proposal appears to have been intended as 
a compromise to appease Randolph, whose alternative, clearer, and 
more narrowly drafted proposal—which granted no express powers to 
the federal government215—the Committee had implicitly rejected. 
This conflict became clear when the issue was debated on Septem-
ber 3. Morris moved to amend the language to reinstate his original pro-
posal and give Congress power to prescribe the effects of legislative 
acts as well as judgments. James Wilson supported the amendment, stat-
ing that ―if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the 
provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place 
among all Independent Nations.‖216 
 
 212 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 483–84. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 445, 448. 
 216 Id. at 488. Wilson‘s comment is significant in a number of respects. It assumes, like Judge 
Shippen in James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786), that even independent na-
tions have some obligation, under appropriate circumstances, to apply the legislative acts of other 
states to issues before them. Such obligations, however, were not seen as an infringement on so-
vereignty because the states themselves applied the principles of ―comity‖ and vested rights that 
gave rise to such obligations. Again, the critical theoretical justification for the extra-territorial 
application of foreign law was Huber, who in his dissertation, De conflictu legum diversarum in 
diversis imperiis, sought to derive a conflicts system ―directly from the notions of sovereignty 
and comity.‖ Juenger, supra note 198, at 434–35; see also Huber, supra note 200, at 401–18. Giv-
ing a different sovereign, i.e., the federal government, power to prescribe the effects of one state‘s 
laws in the proceedings of another state, however, was very much a potential infringement on 
state sovereignty and independent decision-making. It gave the federal government power to 
modify the prevailing conflict rules then seen as part of the law of nations in favor of stricter de-
ference obligations unique to the states of a federal union. 
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For Wilson, that was exactly the point. His comment assumes that 
the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause should impose on the 
states an obligation of interstate deference greater than that which then 
existed ―among all independent nations.‖217 A major goal of the drafters 
of the new Constitution, as we have seen, was to limit state power to 
take actions deleterious to the sister states and the property interests of 
citizens of those states.218 Having just restricted the rights of states to 
issue paper money and impair contract rights, it must surely have 
seemed appropriate to Wilson, Madison and others to further restrict a 
state‘s power to deny effect of sister-state laws in appropriate cases. 
The only way to ensure that such laws would be fairly and un-
iformly enforced, on this view, was to give the federal government 
power to prescribe and police the rules regarding such interstate defe-
rence. While this is an additional grant of power to the federal govern-
ment, it is important to note that it is designed to achieve a particular 
substantive goal, a coordinated economic union, in which rights created 
in one state would be fairly and effectively enforced in all the others.219 
The allocation of power in the second sentence of the Clause was justi-
 
 217 CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). Crosskey makes a 
curious argument here, tying Wilson‘s comment to a supposed ―weakened‖ clause resulting from 
the substitution of ―ought ― for ―shall‖ in the first sentence. This supposedly created a drafting 
dilemma for the Convention that ―was anxious to make as certain as possible that the states were 
bound, whilst, at the same time, they made absolutely certain that plenary legislative power in the 
premises would belong to Congress.‖ Id. Crosskey argues that their first solution to this problem 
was the bizarre ―mandatory direction to Congress to legislate comprehensively,‖ which was later 
solved by Madison‘s more effective reversal of the mandatory and permissive tone of the two 
sentences of the clause. Id. at 552–53 (emphasis omitted); see also discussion supra note 197 and 
accompanying text. This argument seems to me to be fundamentally misguided. First, the debate 
at this point seems totally focused on extending congressional power to legislative acts, not the 
distinction between hortatory and mandatory. Indeed, Wilson‘s comment speaks of ―allowing‖ 
the legislature to declare the effects of legislative acts, not mandating that they do so, which is 
what the language at that point actually seemed to require. Moreover, if Crosskey is right, Madi-
son‘s changes actually altered the meaning of the clause significantly. Under Madison‘s language, 
states are required to give full faith and credit to other states legislative acts, even when Congress 
has not acted (presumably according to the law of nations). Under the committee‘s version, they 
were merely being urged to do so. I think it doubtful such a major change would have been 
adopted without discussion and by a unanimous vote. Finally, Crosskey‘s claim that the Conven-
tion was concerned about insuring that Congress had ―plenary legislative power‖ through consti-
tutional drafting seems inconsistent with the general assumption of Madison and others of legisla-
tive supremacy. See discussion infra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. For reasons stated 
more fully below, I believe the awkward language in the Committee‘s draft represents a certain 
clumsiness in drafting rather than any substantive effort to alter the mandatory nature of the 
states‘ obligation or the plenary power of Congress. 
 218 See Robertson, supra note 24, at 201–03; discussion supra notes 47–55 and accompanying 
text. 
 219 The implication of Wilson‘s comment, after all, is that given this power, the federal legisla-
ture is likely to impose deference obligations on the states greater than those then existing 
―among all Independent Nations.‖ 
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fied as the best way of achieving the substantive goal of the first sen-
tence.220 
Edmund Randolph‘s statement in opposition to Morris‘s proposed 
amendment shows that he understood both his opponents‘ arguments 
and their strategy. Madison‘s notes state: 
Mr. Randolph considered it as strengthening the general objection 
agst. the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government 
was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State pow-
ers. He was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the 
Legislature to provide for the effect of Judgments.221 
Unlike Madison, Randolph‘s objection is based solely on the per-
ceived infringement on state sovereignty, regardless of any beneficial 
results that might be achieved by such a redistribution of powers. He al-
so recognizes that this aggrandizement of federal power has been 
achieved by his opponents through a ―loose‖ definition of powers, like 
those in the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which 
could then be interpreted in expansive ways by subsequent federal legis-
lation and imposed on the states under the Supremacy Clause.222 Madi-
son and his allies, however, saw things differently. They did favor a 
broad allocation of federal power to define and enforce the vague ―full 
 
 220 In Madison‘s notes, Wilson‘s statement is preceded by a curious comment from George 
Mason that he ―favored the motion [presumably, Morris‘ motion to amend], particularly if the 
‗effect‘ was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 
488. Since Morris‘ motion was for the exact opposite purpose, to extend the Federal govern-
ment‘s power to declare the effect of legislative acts as well as judgments, prior commentators 
have assumed that Madison‘s notes were simply mistaken, or at least that Mason‘s comment was 
made at a different time in the debates. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1625 n.192. There is another 
way to understand Mason‘s comment, under which it makes sense in its actual placement. Mason 
might have supported extending the power of the federal government to prescribe the effect of 
out-of-state legislation, but only when the effect of such legislation was an issue in ―judgments 
and judicial proceedings‖ sought to be enforced in another state. This would give the federal gov-
ernment power to prescribe rules for adjudicating cases involving contract or property rights 
created in other states, but would deny it a general power to make the laws of one state binding in 
the territory of another. This is somewhat consistent with the comment of Johnson immediately 
following Wilson‘s statement, that he ―thought the amendment as worded would authorize the 
Genl. Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State, in another State.‖ 2 Far-
rand, supra note 1, at 488. Such an interpretation is also consistent with a major theme of this 
section, that there was general agreement among the framers to create a substantive obligation 
among the states to enforce each others‘ contractual and property rights fairly and consistently, 
but that there was substantial disagreement over how much power the federal government should 
be given to define and expand that obligation. 
 221 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 488–89 (emphasis in original). 
 222 Randolph expanded on these concerns in his letter of October 10, 1787, to the Virginia 
state legislature, where he cited them as one of his primary reasons for seeking greater ease in 
amending the Constitution. 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 123–27. As he stated, ―I also fear more 
from inaccuracies in a constitution, than from gross errors in any other composition; because our 
dearest interests are to be regulated by it; and power, if loosely given, especially where it will be 
interpreted with great latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution.‖ Id. at 126. These concerns 
about potential misuse of unchecked federal power ultimately led both Randolph and Mason to 
refuse to sign the Constitution. See BANNING, supra note 15, at 253. 
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faith and credit‖ obligation, but they saw this as the best means of pro-
tecting and enforcing rights created under sister-state law. The broad, 
vague mandate was necessary not to aggrandize federal power as an end 
in itself, but because of the myriad ways states might avoid or delay 
their obligations to enforce such rights. It was Madison‘s ―federal nega-
tive,‖ but limited to negating state interference with enforcement of oth-
er states‘ vested rights. The vote was a disputed one, but Morris‘s 
amendment was adopted, six states to three.223 
At that point, Madison proposed two additional changes in the lan-
guage of the Clause.224 He suggested that the word ―ought‖ in the first 
sentence be changed to ―shall,‖ and ―shall‖ in the second sentence 
changed to ―may.‖225 These changes were adopted by the Convention 
―nem.con,‖226 i.e., unanimously.227 Some scholars have argued that 
these last minute changes resulted in a significant alteration in the 
meaning of the Clause, either by creating a mandatory obligation on 
states through the first sentence228 or by giving discretionary power to 
the federal legislature in the second.229 
Such contentions seem at odds with the dynamics of the proceed-
ings as set forth in the records of the Convention. The Committee had 
just gotten through a fairly acrimonious debate over whether to extend 
power to declare the effects of public acts to the federal legislature, a 
proposal that was passed in a sharply divided vote involving significant 
concerns about infringements on state sovereignty.230 Why would the 
Convention then accept unanimously an alternative version of the 
Clause that either significantly increased the obligation of states or sig-
nificantly altered the power granted to the federal legislature? 
The most obvious answer is that Madison‘s proposed wording 
changes were not designed to do anything of the sort. They simply im-
proved the language and slightly clarified the meaning of the provision 
that had already been voted on and passed. With respect to the change 
in the first sentence, this is fairly obvious. The word ―shall‖ had defined 
the states‘ full faith obligation in the Articles and in the initial Commit-
 
 223 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 313 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., Cla-
rendon Press 2d ed. 1989). 
 228 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 292 (importance of change from precatory to mandatory lan-
guage in first sentence); Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 71 (importance of ―shall‖ in the first sen-
tence of the Clause); see also Crosskey‘s argument discussed supra note 217. 
 229 Most recently, Professor Engdahl has argued that the addition of ―may‖ in the second sen-
tence of the clause, was designed to mollify Randolph, and that this converted the second sen-
tence from an obligation to declare the effect of sister state judgments to a discretionary plenary 
power. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1627. 
 230 See discussion supra notes 209–218 and accompanying text. 
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tee draft of the constitutional Clause.231 ―Ought‖ had crept in as part of 
Gouverneur Morris‘s proposed amendment.232 Yet the prior debate had 
just made it clear that full faith and credit was to be a somewhat vague 
yet mandatory obligation on the states, an obligation that would be de-
fined and enforced by federal legislation binding on the states under the 
Supremacy Clause.233 Madison‘s reinstatement of ―shall‖ in the first 
sentence of the clause simply made it more accurate and removed a 
small potential ambiguity. 
With respect to the second sentence, the substitution of ―may‖ for 
―shall‖ was a reflection of political reality as Madison and others saw it. 
The Congress they were creating was to be the supreme lawmaking 
body of the nation, and such bodies, by their nature, must have plenary, 
discretionary power, at least with respect to legislative acts. Who, after 
all, could possibly enforce a requirement that Congress ―shall‖ prescribe 
the effects of sister-state judgments if Congress chose not to do so?234 
Once Congress was given the power to prescribe effects, decisions as to 
how to exercise that power had to rest with it. ―May‖ was simply a more 
accurate reflection of the realities of the grant of federal power than 
―shall.‖235 Moreover, as we have seen, Madison and others assumed that 
a federal legislature would have the appropriate incentives and perspec-
tives to promote fair and consistent enforcement of the rights of out-of-
state litigants.236 With the acceptance of Madison‘s changes, the consti-
tutional Full Faith and Credit Clause was essentially complete.237 
As the Constitutional Convention came to a close, Madison‘s feel-
ings about the work of the Convention were surprisingly negative. In a 
short letter to Thomas Jefferson dated September 6, 1787, Madison ex-
pressed his opinion that ―the plan [i.e., the proposed Constitution], 
should it be adopted, will neither effectually answer its national object, 
 
 231 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV; 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489. 
 232 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489. While ―ought‖ can be used to describe a somewhat weaker 
form of obligation than ―shall,‖ it can also describe the same level of obligation with a more nor-
mative implication. (Consider a parent‘s statement, ―you ought to stop playing video games and 
start doing your homework right now.‖). It is likely Morris had this increased normative obliga-
tion in mind when he changed ―shall‖ to ―ought.‖ 
 233 Id. at 488. 
 234 The relatively few mandatory provisions in the Constitution involving Congress, mostly in 
Article I, Section 9, all involve prohibitions on congressional action as does most of the Bill of 
Rights, which Madison famously first opposed. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, amends. I–X. Such 
prohibitions might possibly be enforced through presidential veto and/or judicial action, although 
most likely, as we shall see, through legislative restraint. Creating an affirmative constitutional 
obligation on Congress to pass a particular type of law, however, would have appeared both un-
workable and incoherent. 
 235 It is also likely that Morris, in stating that Congress ―shall by general laws‖ prescribe the 
rules for proof and effect of sister state laws and judgments, did not intend to impose any such 
mandate on Congress, but simply to exclude their power to act by anything other than general 
laws, that is, by private legislation. 
 236 See discussion supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 237 The only subsequent change was the substitution of the word ―Congress‖ for legislature. 
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not prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts agst. 
the State Governments.‖238 
With respect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, Madi-
son never expressed anything but satisfaction and unqualified approval. 
He praised the ―effects clause‖ in Federalist No. 42 as a ―marked im-
provement‖ over the Articles‘ clause.239 In the debates on the Constitu-
tion before the Virginia Legislature, Madison‘s approval was even more 
emphatic. In response to a question from George Mason raising again 
the propriety of a clause that granted Congress power to declare the ef-
fect of one state‘s acts in another state, Madison replied that in his opi-
nion, ―this is a clause which is absolutely necessary. I have never heard 
any objection to this clause before, and have not employed a thought on 
the subject.‖240 
Madison appears never to have perceived any potential conflict be-
tween the first and second sentences of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
and certainly makes no mention of it at this time or in his later writings. 
Why this should be so is the topic of the third and final part. 
 
III.     MADISON, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE NATURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
A.     The Ahistorical Question 
 
This Article began by pointing out the inconsistency between the 
first and second sentences of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It is an 
 
 238 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 77. A month later, he expanded on those concerns in a longer 
letter to Jefferson, which bemoaned the absence of a ―federal negative‖ in the proposed Constitu-
tion and expressed pessimism that the judiciary could effectively enforce the various constitution-
al prohibitions on state legislative misconduct that had been included or the separation of federal 
and state powers set forth in that document. Madison stated: 
It may be said that the Judicial authority, under our new system will keep the States 
within their proper limits, and supply the place of a negative on their laws. The answer 
is, that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law than to declare it void after 
it is passed; that this will be particularly the case, where the law aggrieves individuals, 
who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme Judiciary; that a 
State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready 
to obey a Judicial decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to force, which, in 
the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution 
meant to exclude as far as possible. 
Id. at 134 (Letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 24, 1787). 
 239 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 240 3 Elliot, supra note 196, at 584–85. It is true that Madison‘s support for the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause was expressed in public debate, while his misgivings about the Constitution as a 
whole were expressed privately in letters to friends. Nonetheless, it is significant that even in pub-
lic debate, Madison appeared to believe that the Clause was a relatively uncontroversial part of 
the Constitution that needed little polemical support. In his private letters regarding the Constitu-
tion, he appears never to have found the Clause worth mentioning at all. 
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inconsistency that is readily apparent to all modern legal scholars, and 
most recent work on the Clause has been, at least in significant part, at-
tempts to explain and resolve that inconsistency.241 The currently pre-
vailing view of the Clause‘s history (which this Article has largely re-
jected) is that the first sentence originally embodied a relatively modest 
evidentiary rule, requiring states only to recognize judgments of other 
states as official acts of those states, and to treat them as prima facie 
evidence of the underlying claim.242 Even this reading does not remove 
the inconsistency between the first and second sentences of the Clause, 
however, since the plenary power granted in the second sentence would 
appear to give Congress power to authorize states to abrogate even a 
prima facie rule. 
All such attempts to provide a correct historical understanding of 
the inconsistency in the Full Faith and Credit Clause are unsatisfactory 
because they are adopting an ahistorical perspective on the problem. 
They (and we, in the introduction to this Article) are seeking to provide 
a ―legal‖ interpretation of the Clause, that is, the kind of interpretation a 
judge would arrive at if asked to determine the appropriate limits of the 
powers granted to Congress under the Clause. Interpreting the Clause in 
this ―legal‖ way means adopting the perspective of a judge, a neutral, 
retrospective reviewer of congressional action, with the right to make 
the ultimate decision as to whether constitutional limits have been ex-
ceeded. We adopt such a perspective easily because we have been 
trained to view the Constitution primarily as a legal document, to be 
analyzed by methods similar to those utilized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its legal opinions. In this sense, the concept and practice of 
judicial review is critical to our modern understanding of the Constitu-
tion. 
In recent years, there has been much important historical work 
done on the origins of the concept of judicial review.243 That work has 
shed new light on the difference between the way the Constitution was 
perceived at the time of the Founding and in later periods. In The 
People Themselves, Larry Kramer has argued that the ―modern under-
 
 241 Commentators like Laycock and Tribe privilege the first sentence of the clause and believe 
it imposes significant constitutional limits on Congressional action. See 142 CONG. REC. S5932 
(daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Pro-
fessor, Harvard Law Sch., and Ralph S. Taylor, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Edward M. 
Kennedy, U.S. Senator (May 24, 1996)); Laycock, supra note 3, at 297-305. Crane, in contrast, 
privileges the second sentence, reducing the first sentence to a default rule. Crane, supra note 3, 
at 323–34. Engdahl, Sachs and Whitten, by providing a narrower reading of the first sentence of 
the Clause, reduce its importance, but do not entirely remove the tension between the first and 
second sentences of the Clause. See discussion supra notes 3–7. 
 242 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1655; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1206; Whitten, FF&C and 
DOMA, supra note 3, at 257. 
 243 See, e.g., KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29; Rakove, Origins, supra note 29, at 1031; 
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 457 (2005). 
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standing‖ of the Constitution as ―a species of law‖ is ―of surprisingly 
recent vintage.‖244 Kramer states that ―[b]oth in its origins and for most 
of our history . . . [f]inal interpretive authority rested with ‗the people 
themselves,‘ and courts no less than elected representatives were subor-
dinate to their judgments.‖245 Jack Rakove and others have shown that 
while a concept of judicial review derived from the Supremacy Clause 
was a part of the original constitutional scheme (enacted in part as a 
more limited alternative to Madison‘s ―federal negative‖), that concept 
of judicial review was effectively limited to policing state legislation 
that encroached on federal prerogatives, and was not expected to act as 
a constraint on federal legislative power.246 
From this perspective, we can see that the question how Madison 
would have resolved the potential inconsistency between the first and 
second sentences of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (or even why he 
did not recognize it) are both ahistorical questions. The questions them-
selves presuppose a ―legal‖ reading of the Constitution as a set of fun-
damental laws that constrain the actions of all branches of government. 
For Madison, the salient question was not whether the Constitution, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, should constrain Congress‘ exercise 
of power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (a possibility he viewed 
as both improper and unlikely), but whether Congress itself would act 
properly and constitutionally in exercising its powers under that and 
other clauses of the Constitution. 
 
 244 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 7–8; see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1990) (early understanding of the Constitution 
as ―a political instrument different in kind from ordinary law‖). 
 245 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 8. 
 246 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (noting that ―in controversies relating to the 
boundary between the two jurisdictions [state and federal], the tribunal which is ultimately to de-
cide, is to be established under the general government‖); see also Rakove, Origins, supra note 
29, at 1047. Rakove argues that ―[u]ndisputably, judicial review, conceived as a mechanism of 
federalism, was palpably and unequivocally a fundamental element of the original intention of the 
Constitution with the Supremacy Clause as its trumpet.‖ Id. Rakove goes on to show that ―this 
was the dimension of judicial review that originally mattered most—as opposed to the rival (and 
theoretically more interesting) claim of judicial supremacy in the form of final review of national 
legislation.‖ Id. Gordon Wood similarly argued that Madison never viewed constitutional ques-
tions as ordinary law whose final adjudication was ultimately left to courts. Rather, ―[b]oth Jef-
ferson and Madison remained convinced to the end of their lives that all parts of America‘s gov-
ernments had equal authority to interpret the fundamental law of the Constitution . . . .‖ Wood, 
Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796. Similarly, Sylvia Snowiss has argued that in the 
earliest periods of the republic, ―judicial enforcement of the Constitution was an extraordinary 
political act, a judicial substitute for revolution‖ and was limited to the ―concededly unconstitu-
tional act.‖ SNOWISS, supra note 244, at 3, 34–44. More recently, Dean Treanor, in an exhaustive 
study of judicial review cases prior to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), found 
that cases enforcing such federalism constraints in this period invariably struck down state rather 
than federal legislation. Treanor, supra note 243, at 457; see also Jenna Bednar, The Madisonian 
Scheme to Control the National Government, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 217, 223–24 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003) (describing Madison‘s 
objections to judicial review). 
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For Madison in 1787, there was only a small and somewhat theo-
retical distinction between unwise or improper actions by Congress and 
unconstitutional ones. The Constitution was intended to influence and 
constrain the federal legislature, giving them an additional reason to do 
what Madison hoped their national perspective and concern for political 
virtue would already incline them to do: abjure ―faction‖ and pass laws 
in the national interest. We do not see Madison worrying about the pre-
cise limits of congressional constitutional powers because these con-
cerns are part of his broader worry (which we see manifested often) that 
the entire plan for a federal union may fail.247 
Nonetheless, Madison‘s statements also show that he hoped and 
expected that the Constitution would constrain congressional action to 
some degree, even if the constraints were only internal appeals to right 
action. It is also clear that Madison viewed the grant of power to Con-
gress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as designed to achieve a 
particular result: to promote ―harmony and proper intercourse‖ among 
the states.248 
With this in mind, it is possible to refashion the question regarding 
Madison‘s original understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
into a historically coherent one, by asking to what extent did Madison 
expect and hope that the Clause (or other binding constraints presup-
posed by the Clause, such as the law of nations249) would constrain the 
exercise of power granted to Congress under the Clause. On this point, 
the historical evidence points strongly to the conclusion that Madison 
did not believe that the power to be exercised by Congress would be un-
constrained. Rather, it would be limited by the law of nations, by the 
―indeterminate‖ (but far from meaningless) first sentence of the Clause, 
which at least mandated the deference required by the law of nations, 
and quite possibly even more substantive levels of deference, and final-
ly, by the ―nature of the Union‖ itself,250 which could justify lawmaking 
that strengthened the federal union and promoted harmony among states 
well beyond any that had previously existed under the Articles of Con-
federation.251 In short, the Clause fit perfectly with Madison‘s broader 
constitutional plan. Congress would be acting both properly and consti-
tutionally when it enacted laws which promoted deference and harmony 
among the states, but would be acting both improperly and unconstitu-
tionally if it passed laws that permitted states to ignore or abrogate 
judgments or laws of sister states. 
 
 247 See Madison, Letter to Jefferson, supra note 119, at 326; see also 3 Farrand, supra note 
135, at 85 (Benjamin Franklin‘s comment, ―[a] republic . . . if you can keep it.‖). 
 248 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 249 See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1137–39. 
 250 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448. 
 251 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madi-
son); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
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Accordingly, the power granted to Congress in the second sentence 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is ―plenary‖ only in the very limited 
sense that Madison believed that no other political institution (including 
the Supreme Court) could or should constrain congressional lawmaking 
powers. But Madison believed and hoped that powerful legal, moral, 
political, and constitutional constraints were being created by the new 
plan of government that would prevent Congress from making laws that 
violated the mandate of the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. 
The following two sections provide the historical bases for these 
conclusions, focusing first on Madison‘s views on the institutional or 
external constraints of Congressional action and then on the internal 
constraints on such actions. 
 
B.     Constitutional Interpretative Authority and Institutional 
Constraints on Congressional Lawmaking Power 
 
To understand the Full Faith and Credit Clause as Madison unders-
tood it, we must jettison the idea that the Constitution is primarily a 
species of law, subject to comprehensive judicial interpretation, and 
view it rather, as Madison did, as a ―plan‖ for a new government.252 
Understanding the ―plan‖ of the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires 
resolving two rather different issues, one involving federalism and the 
other separation of powers. The federalism question was whether states 
or the federal government would have the power to define, specify, and 
enforce the requirement of interstate deference set forth in the Clause. 
The second sentence of the Clause definitively resolved that issue by 
expressly giving power to the federal legislature to ―prescribe‖ the ―ef-
fects‖ of state judgments and legislative acts in other states. We have 
seen that this was a somewhat controversial position, won only after 
substantial debate, yet one that Madison believed made the Clause an 
―evident and valuable improvement‖ over its predecessor.253 
Yet the reason for that anticipated improvement was that Madison 
hoped and expected the federal legislature to effectively enforce and 
strengthen the requirements of interstate deference set forth in the first 
section of the Clause.254 He expected them to act that way in accordance 
 
 252 In the period after the Constitutional Convention, Madison frequently used the term ―plan‖ 
to refer to the proposed Constitution in both his public and private writings. See, e.g., 3 Farrand, 
supra note 135, at 98 (Madison‘s letter to Edmund Pendleton dated Sept. 20, 1787); id. at 135–36 
(Madison‘s letter to Thomas Jefferson dated Oct. 24, 1787); id. at 361 (Madison‘s statement in 
House of Representatives dated Apr. 22, 1790); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
 253 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 254 See id. It should be noted that the one ―improvement‖ Madison envisions in Federalist 
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with his elaborate theory of the federal government acting in the nation-
al interest and as a neutral arbiter among states. He certainly hoped they 
would act that way, but did he think they were constitutionally required 
to act that way? This raises the second, separation of powers question: 
Does the Constitution itself, particularly the first sentence of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, impose any limits on federal lawmaking power 
regarding interstate deference? 
This question, which looms so large today, would have appeared to 
Madison to be so abstract and impractical as to be almost unanswerable. 
The important institutional fact for Madison was that Congress had both 
the political power and normative right to determine the propriety and 
the constitutionality of their actions without any second-guessing by the 
Supreme Court. Asking whether they were constrained by the Constitu-
tion, therefore, was a little like asking the same question today regard-
ing the Justices of the Supreme Court.255 
As Rakove notes, ―[f]or Madison in the 1780s, the political supe-
riority of the legislature—and especially the lower house—was the do-
minant fact of republican government, and all calculations about the ca-
pacities of other institutions were the dependent variables of this 
fact.‖256 
 
42—more effective enforcement of claims against those who have ―suddenly and secretly trans-
lated‖ their property (―effects liable to justice‖) across the ―borders of contiguous states‖—
involves greater harmony and coordination between the legal systems of different states. Id. 
Whether this will be the result of a law requiring enforcement of the judgments of one state in 
those of others or some less drastic Congressional action is unclear. What is clear is that Madison 
saw the grant of power to Congress in the second sentence of the Clause, not as an improvement 
in itself, but as a means of improving harmony and coordination among state legal systems.
 
 255 In this regard, it is worth considering whether we would describe the Supreme Court‘s de-
cision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as ―unconstitutional.‖ On the one hand, we 
now recognize the Supreme Court‘s plenary power, as an unreviewable decision-maker, to make 
whatever decision it wants with respect to a case that falls within its jurisdiction. Yet we also be-
lieve that the Supreme Court is normatively obligated to follow the Constitution, and, I assume, 
most of us hold a view of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, even as it was unders-
tood at the time Plessy was decided, which would lead us to conclude that, we, if we had been on 
the Supreme Court, we would have felt constitutionally obligated to rule the other way. We might 
try to square the circle by saying something like ―Plessy v. Ferguson is inconsistent with the 
proper understanding of the constitutional norms embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ 
  I submit that Madison might well have answered a question about congressional passage of 
a law abolishing existing obligations of sister state deference in much the same way. He would 
have recognized that under the second sentence of the Clause, Congress had power, ―jurisdiction‖ 
one might say, to make such a law, but would also assert Congress‘ normative obligation to pass 
laws consistent with the first sentence of the Clause. See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 
137 (discussion of the Revolution of 1800); discussion supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 256 Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1513, 1531 (2002) [hereinafter Rakove, Judicial Power]. In his analysis of Madi-
son‘s political thought at the time, Rakove shows that Madison was deeply pessimistic that the 
judiciary could act as an effective means of curbing state legislative abuses.
 
See John Ferejohn, 
Madisonian Separation of Powers, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 126, 132 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003) (―[Madison] regarded the legis-
lative power as difficult or impossible to place under external limitations.‖). Rakove shows that as 
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Madison anticipated that the new government would have radically 
different methods for resolving questions regarding the constitutionality 
of state laws and those enacted by the federal government. While Madi-
son had pragmatic and political doubts about the judiciary being able to 
fulfill its constitutionally anticipated role in enforcing federal superiori-
ty against contrary state laws, there is no doubt they had been given that 
role.257 With respect to determinations of the constitutionality of federal 
laws, however, where the judiciary had no specified constitutional role, 
258 Madison had principled as well as pragmatic concerns about the ju-
diciary taking for itself the role of final arbiter of the constitutionality of 
actions by coordinate branches of the federal government. 
Recent scholarship has shown that in its inception, and for many 
years thereafter, the ―American doctrine of judicial review was far more 
concerned with federalism than with separation of powers,‖ and that 
 
early as 1785, Madison‘s writings imply that ―fundamental violations of a constitutional scheme 
would not be amenable to judicial correction in the ordinary course of things‖ and that ―the judi-
ciary had no special duty or capacity to maintain constitutional norms.‖ Rakove, Judicial Power, 
supra note 256, at 1518.
 
Madison‘s work in drafting the Constitution did not improve his view concerning the effective-
ness of the judicial branch. He continued to believe it was a mistake to reject his idea of a Con-
gressional ―negative‖ on state legislation and to leave it to the judiciary, acting through the Su-
premacy Clause, to police the boundary between constitutional and unconstitutional state 
legislative acts. His concerns were two-fold. See 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 133–34 (Madison‘s 
letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 24, 1787). First, the very nature of judicial process 
meant that challenges to state legislation could only arise in an uncertain, haphazard, and belated 
manner, when an aggrieved but well funded individual chose to pursue a judicial remedy through 
the appellate process. Id. at 134. He doubted that the mere possibility of such ex post challenges 
would exert much restraint on state legislatures. Id. 
  An even greater problem, however, was that the judicial branch had no political means of 
enforcing its rulings on the states. As Madison noted, 
[A] State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very 
ready to obey a judicial decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to force, 
which, in the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an Evil which the new Con-
stitution meant to exclude as far as possible. 
Id. at 134. As Rakove states, ―[Madison‘s] reservations were pragmatic. Judicial power will simp-
ly be too weak to provide a satisfactory solution to the challenges to national supremacy he still 
expected the states to mount.‖ Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1525. 
 257 This is not to say that Madison and the other founders were unaware of the theoretical 
power of courts to declare legislative acts, particularly state legislative acts, invalid as violative of 
the Constitution. This is the doctrine of ―repugnancy‖ which, in a recent article, Mary Bilder has 
argued was imported from English corporate law doctrines into the basis for American judicial 
review. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 502 
(2006). While Madison and the other founders were certainly aware of this concept as a mode of 
argument, he seems to have little confidence that a judicial declaration of repugnancy or invalidi-
ty could be an effective check on legislative misconduct, even with respect to federalism concerns 
where he argued, at least to the public, that the courts could adequately prevent overreaching by 
state legislatures. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). 
 258 See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 77–78; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962); Kramer, 
We the Court, supra note 41, at 5; Rakove, Origins, supra note 29, at 1036. But see Saikrishna B. 
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 894–913 (2003) 
(arguing that judicial review is implicit in the constitutional text). 
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there was a strong presumption against judicial invalidation of federal 
legislation.259 For Madison, this was a normative as well as a pragmatic 
concern. He believed the judicial branch should have no greater right to 
determine the ultimate meaning of the Constitution than the other two 
branches of the federal government. He made this point explicitly in his 
1788 comments on Jefferson‘s ―draught‖ of a state constitution: 
In the State Constitutions & indeed in the Fed‘l one also, no provi-
sion is made for the case of a disagreement in expounding them; and 
as the courts are generally the last in making [their] decision, it re-
sults to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it 
with its final character. This makes the Judiciary Dep‘t paramount in 
fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be 
proper.260 
As Rakove points out, Madison‘s main objection to this arrange-
ment is that it seems to give the judiciary the final say in an act‘s consti-
tutionality as a matter of ―inadvertent final decision,‖ not on the basis of 
any constitutional plan or principle.261 
As a matter of normative political principle, Madison believed that 
all three branches of government ―had equal authority to interpret the 
fundamental law of the Constitution.‖262 Ideally, the ultimate decision 
should be left to the people through some form of ―popular constitutio-
nalism.‖263 
 
 259 Rakove, Origins, supra note 29, at 1034; see also Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra 
note 12, at 798 (judicial declaration of a law‘s invalidity was ―an extraordinary and solemn politi-
cal action‖ done only when there was a ―clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution‖); Trea-
nor, supra note 243, at 458–59 (arguing that different standards of review were applied by courts 
to federalism and separation of powers issues). 
  Describing cases in which the federal courts review the constitutionality of state legislation 
as involving ―federalism‖ and those involving review of federal legislation as involving ―separa-
tion of powers‖ as Rakove frequently and Treanor sometimes does, can be somewhat misleading. 
Questions involving the constitutionally valid scope of federal lawmaking authority, what we 
might properly call ―federalism‖ issues can be raised in challenges to either federal or state sta-
tutes. Questions involving the federal judiciary‘s power to invalidate federal legislation, which we 
might call ―separation of powers‖ issues, can only arise in review of federal legislation, but may 
also involve federalism questions (as when the challenged legislative act is claimed to be within 
an area of exclusive state lawmaking power). While there is some dispute in the recent historical 
work as to how frequently and easily courts invalidated state statutes as unconstitutional, compare 
Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796–97 with Treanor, supra note 243, at 457–
58, there is a general consensus that successful judicial challenges to federal statutes were contro-
versial and extremely rare. See Treanor, supra note 243, at 457–58; Wood, Judicial Review Revi-
sited, supra note 12, at 796–97, 803–07. 
 260 James Madison, Observations on the “Draught of a Constitution for Virginia.‖ (Aug. 
1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 294 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 
1904) [hereinafter Madison, Observations]. 
 261 Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1530. 
 262 Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796. 
 263 Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1529. This is a modern term for the historical 
concept that authoritative determination of Constitutional meaning ultimately rests with the 
people, not the Supreme Court. See generally KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 8; Kra-
mer, We the Court, supra note 41, at 162. Madison set forth one version of ―popular constitutio-
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In writing about the role of the people in countering legislative 
abuses, Madison made some distinction between laws passed by the leg-
islature that are ―precipitate‖ or ―unjust‖ and those that are ―unconstitu-
tional,‖ but not that much of a distinction.264 For Madison, the point is 
that the legislature remains the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality 
of its own lawmaking, with the only effective check on it being the 
popular electoral process itself. 
With respect to the constitutionality of state laws under the Supre-
macy Clause, the Constitution clearly did make the Supreme Court the 
ultimate arbiter of such matters,265 and Madison, in public, defended its 
capacity to fulfill that role, while expressing his own doubts in pri-
vate.266 We have seen, however, that Madison was normatively opposed 
to any ―inadvertent‖ procedures that might give the judiciary the final 
say on the constitutionality of federal legislation, believing that the 
people themselves, through the electoral process, could be the only legi-
timate arbiters of ultimate constitutional meaning.267 
Gordon Wood has argued that in order for judicial power to review 
the constitutionality of federal legislation to emerge and be accepted in 
the United States, there had to be changes from the time of the Found-
 
nalism‖ in his 1788 comments to Jefferson‘s draft of a state constitution. There, Madison pro-
posed that a ―Council of Revision‖ could act as a ―check to precipitate, to unjust, and to unconsti-
tutional laws.‖ Madison, Observations, supra note 260, at 293–94. Legislative acts would be 
communicated to the judicial and executive branches and if either objected, such objections could 
only be overruled by a supermajority vote of the legislature. Id. If the objection were based on the 
law‘s perceived unconstitutionality, however, even a supermajority vote would not suffice. Ra-
ther, the law would be ―suspended . . . until there shall have been a subsequent election of the 
[House of Delegates]‖ and then the requisite supermajority vote by that newly elected assembly. 
Id at 294. Once such approval had been achieved, however, ―it [should] not be allowed the Judges 
or [the] Executive to pronounce a law thus enacted [unconstitutional] & invalid.‖ Id.; see Bednar, 
supra note 246, at 227–28. 
 264 Id. at 293. In his comments on Jefferson‘s draft state constitution, Madison sees the role of 
the council of revision for both unjust and unconstitutional laws as simply to delay enactment and 
force legislative reconsideration and a supermajority vote, the sole difference being that allegedly 
unconstitutional laws would be reconsidered by a newly elected legislature, id. at 293–94, after an 
election in which the disputed constitutional questions would, presumably, have been a matter of 
public debate. See 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 73; Sherry, supra note 36, at 1159 (discussing 
comment made by Wilson at the Convention that ―laws may be unjust, may be dangerous, may be 
destructive; and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give 
them effect.‖). Sherry argues that this notion of a ―continuum of unconstitutionality coinciding 
with a continuum of injustice‖ reflects an older view of the constitution as including all funda-
mental law. Id. at 1159. It should also be noted that the concept of a ―continuum of unconstitutio-
nality‖ is also very different from modern ―legal‖ notions of the Constitution. 
 265 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 266 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); see also Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 
256, at 1524–28. 
 267 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). Contrast this with Hamilton‘s position in Fede-
ralist 78, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), and Madison‘s willingness in permit 
some interpretive work in his letter to Roane. See James Madison, Letter to Spencer Roane (June 
29, 1821), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 66–67 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s 
Sons 1910) [hereinafter Madison, Letter to Roane]. 
YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC 9/9/2011  6:08 PM 
2011] MADISON’S  FULL FAITH AND CREDIT  183 
ing in popular attitudes toward the Constitution itself, as well as toward 
federal judges and federal legislators.268 To understand Madison‘s view 
of the constitutional constraints on federal legislation at the time of the 
Founding, it is necessary to revert to all these earlier positions. For 
Madison in 1787 and 1788, the Constitution was not law in the ordinary 
sense, but the fundamental plan for the organization of government, to 
be read and interpreted with equal authority by all three branches of the 
federal government, but whose final meaning could only be established 
by the will of the people.269 Judges had not the power, authority, nor ex-
pertise to be its final arbiters. But the federal legislature, Madison 
―hoped against hope,‖ 270 would be composed of impartial and disinte-
rested men who would function as ―dispassionate umpires‖ in conflicts 
between different interests.271 In short, while unconstitutional state laws 
could and should be invalidated through normal and well-established 
judicial procedures, allegedly unconstitutional actions by the federal 
legislature were best corrected by the political process itself, preferably 
through periodic debate and elections.272 
It is against this institutional background that we must consider 
Madison‘s likely understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
Note first that the distinction just outlined between the procedures for 
constraining unconstitutional state laws and unconstitutional federal ac-
tion is reflected in the language of the Clause itself. We have seen that 
for Madison, the primary purpose of the Clause was its effect on states, 
to inhibit their ―trespasses‖ against each other, and to provide for their 
―harmony and proper intercourse.‖273 From this perspective, the Clause 
was well drafted to accomplish its purpose. It established a broad area 
of federal lawmaking power, where Congress could prescribe and de-
 
 268 See generally Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12. Wood argues that a radical 
reconceptualization of political legitimacy took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. The Constitution, originally conceived as embodying fundamental principles so different 
from ordinary law that its invocation by a court to nullify validly enacted legislation was ―an ex-
traordinary, even revolutionary, expression of public authority,‖ a rare event regarded by the 
founders with ―a sense of awe and wonder,‖ id. at 796, had to become ―the kind of law that an 
ordinary court system could expound and construe.‖ Id. at 799. The judiciary, disparaged in the 
revolutionary period as ―appendages or extensions of royal authority,‖ id. at 789-90, came to be 
seen as another type of agent of the people, carrying out the people‘s will by, among other things, 
keeping legislators ―within the limits assigned to their authority.‖ Id. at 794 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)). Legislators, in turn, rather than being viewed as the 
unique representatives of the people, were merely one of the people‘s agents, prone to faction and 
majoritarian overreaching. They would have to come to be regarded, in short, as mere politicians. 
Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 808–09; see also Rakove, Origins, supra note 
29, at 1051–60 (arguing that a change in the perception of legislation led to increased acceptance 
of the idea of the judiciary as a check on legislative power). 
 269 Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796. 
 270 Id. at 792. 
 271 Id. 
 272 See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 84–85. 
 273 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
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scribe the rules for interstate deference, and, as federal law, those rules 
would become binding on all states under the Supremacy Clause274 and 
enforceable in the federal courts. With respect to the federal legislature, 
however, the first sentence of the Clause imposes no express obligations 
(it mandates deference only by states) and only confers power in the 
second sentence, which Congress may or may not exercise.275 These dif-
ferent approaches to the exercise of state and federal power were epito-
mized by Madison‘s final amendments to the Clause, where the state‘s 
obligations were expressed by the mandatory ―shall,‖ the federal gov-
ernment‘s by the discretionary word ―may.‖276 
I argued previously that the unanimous approval of these changes 
by the Committee, particularly after substantial disagreement over the 
language of the second sentence, suggests that they were viewed as cla-
rifying rather than substantive amendments.277 The discussion in this 
section has indicated why that was so. Madison and many others ex-
pected that the constitution they were drafting would apply very diffe-
rently to the states and to the federal legislature. For states, it would be 
mandatory and the source of external constraints, giving the federal 
government, in certain areas, power to invalidate state law and compel 
obedience to its higher authority. For the branches of the federal gov-
ernment created and empowered by that constitution, however, there 
were no external constraints, and that was particularly true of the federal 
legislature, which had both the most direct popular support and the 
broadest political power. Clearly, there was no agency of government 
that could compel Congress to pass any laws its members did not want 
to pass, and it was far from clear whether any such agency could prohi-
bit Congress from acting in the few areas where the Constitution ex-
pressly forbid such action.278 Accordingly, it made sense to describe 
their legislative power in terms of laws they ―may‖ choose to make. 
Note that, as far as the states are concerned, there is no conflict be-
tween the first and second clauses of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
States are obligated to obey whatever deference rules federal courts de-
rive from the first sentence of the Clause as well as any laws promulgat-
ed by Congress under the second sentence.279 Madison thereby made 
use of the judiciary‘s power to enforce and perhaps strengthen existing 
 
 274 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 275 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 276 See 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489. 
 277 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 278 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 279 Under the constitutional plan, the obligation of state legislatures to obey deference obliga-
tions set forth both in the Constitution, as interpreted by the federal judiciary, and by the federal 
legislature, is clear. A problem arises only if the Supreme Court and Congress disagree as to the 
nature of that deference obligation. That is not a problem of federalism, but of separation of pow-
ers, the very problem that is the subject of this section. 
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―indeterminate‖ case law under the Articles‘ clause while providing a 
congressional power to alter any unfortunate decisions by an unreliable 
judiciary and to increase the deference obligation over time.280 If the ju-
diciary chose to interpret the obligations of the first sentence as a strong 
rule of substantive deference, there would be less need for congressional 
action. If the courts caved in to state interests, congressional power was 
clearly available to correct such ―mistakes.‖ 
It is only the federal legislature whose powers might be viewed in-
consistently under the Clause, seemingly constrained by the first sen-
tence and unconstrained by the second. We have seen, however, that 
this is an ahistorical way to look at the Clause. 
We perceive the potential conflict between the first and second 
sentence because we view ourselves as neutral arbiters of its meaning, 
trying to understand how much power it actually gives to Congress. In 
short, we put ourselves in the role of the Supreme Court, viewing the 
Constitution as a species of law. Such a perspective would have been 
alien to Madison, who assumed that legislative actions by Congress 
were effectively unreviewable by the Supreme Court or any other agen-
cy of government.281 The broad power given under the second sentence 
of the Clause would not have seemed inconsistent with the constraints 
of the first from a perspective of congressional supremacy. The first 
sentence defined the goal or purpose of the grant of congressional pow-
er, in much the way the copyright and patent powers were granted ―to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts,‖ or the way the 
broad grant of power to prescribe the time, place, and manner of elect-
ing representatives was not inconsistent with the mandatory guarantee 
of a republican form of government.282 
Put another way, from Madison‘s 1787 perspective, what appears 
to us to be a mandatory limitation on congressional power in the first 
sentence of the clause would have appeared more like guidance or in-
struction to an essentially unreviewable legislative body. And, what ap-
pears to us as a grant of plenary lawmaking power in the second sen-
tence would have appeared to Madison as simply recognition of existing 
political reality. It becomes easier to understand, therefore, why the ap-
parent conflict between the first and second sentences of the Clause 
 
 280 Madison privately expressed doubts that the judiciary would resist state interests in enforc-
ing the Constitution. 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 134 (Letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 
24, 1787); see also Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1523–25. 
 281 See discussion supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 282 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Crosskey argues that the draftsmanship of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is somewhat similar to the Time, Place and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4. 
CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 553 & n.†. This is significant because Crosskey also argues that 
the Republican Government Clause limits the Time, Place and Manner Clause. Id. at 524. I have 
argued here that the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit clause places a similar limitation on 
the powers granted Congress in the second sentence of the Clause. 
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would not have seemed troubling to Madison and possibly not even no-
ticeable. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, the distinction between an unwise, 
improper, and unconstitutional law was not nearly as great for Madison 
as it is for us now. This was in part because Americans, like English 
lawyers of Madison‘s time, viewed various fundamental natural law 
doctrines as constitutional constraints on legislative power.283 Probably 
more significant from Madison‘s perspective, however, was that as a 
practical political matter, he believed the only remedy for unconstitu-
tional lawmaking was the same as for unwise or improper laws, a repud-
iation and unseating of the erring legislature through the democratic 
process.284 
Although Madison viewed the distinction between unconstitutional 
laws and unwise ones as far less significant than we do, he nonetheless 
recognized the distinction, primarily because he thought unconstitutio-
nality provided stronger normative grounds for rejecting bad legislation, 
both as an electoral issue and in the process of internal deliberation 
among legislators. Accordingly, the question whether a federal law 
permitting states to abrogate existing requirements of interstate defe-
rence was unconstitutional or merely unwise was a question he would 
have understood, although might not have viewed as particularly impor-
tant. Given the centrality of that question to contemporary legal debates 
regarding the DOMA, however, it is worth examining in some detail in 
the final section of this Article. 
 
C.     The Constitution as Internal Constraint on Federal Lawmaking 
 
Madison was famously concerned with the problem of ―faction,‖ 
the ―dangerous vice‖ ―under which popular governments everywhere 
have perished.‖285 His hoped-for solution, or at least amelioration of the 
problem, rested with his belief that a large republic, whose lawmakers 
would consist of both directly and indirectly elected representatives of 
 
 283 See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1137–39; see also discussion supra notes 34–36 and accom-
panying text. A case frequently discussed in this connection is Trevett v. Weeden, an unreported 
1786 Rhode Island case striking down a Rhode Island statute that required acceptance of paper 
currency as satisfaction of debts. The law was struck down, probably because it explicitly denied 
defendants a right to jury trial, even though the jury trial right was not mentioned in Rhode Isl-
and‘s founding charter and Rhode Island, at the time, had no written constitution. See SNOWISS, 
supra note 244, at 20–22; Sherry, supra note 36, at 1138–41. 
 284 See discussion supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text; see also KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 48–49. 
 285 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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various states, would be better able to resist the dangers of faction than 
had most of the doomed republics of history.286 
Madison conceived the effect of this large, representative republic 
as combating faction in two quite different ways. The first was by creat-
ing a nation and a government sufficiently large and diverse that no sin-
gle faction could easily come to dominate it or even control a majority 
of its members, thereby making it ―less probable that a majority of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citi-
zens.‖287 The natural impediments that a large republic posed to the de-
velopment of factions was buttressed in the Constitution by the numer-
ous institutional checks and balances created to further impede any 
single religious persuasion, economic interest, or regional alignment 
from gaining control of the government. These checks and balances 
were based on a pessimistic view of human nature, which assumed that 
politicians frequently acted out of narrow self-interest, or at least fre-
quently persuaded themselves that the interests of themselves or their 
group of supporters were also the best interests of the nation. Madison 
hoped to cancel the deleterious effects of such self-interest by setting 
various modes of self-interested conduct in opposition to each other. 
But there was another side to Madison‘s plan to combat faction, 
one based on a more optimistic view of human nature. Madison be-
lieved that elected representatives could act out of more than just self-
interested or partisan motives. They could be ―representatives whose 
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local 
prejudices and schemes of injustice,‖288 who would be ―proper guar-
dians of the public weal,‖ and whose decisions ―will be more consonant 
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.‖ The 
Constitution provided institutional means to promote this defense to fac-
tion as well: the indirect election of representatives through ―the me-
dium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the 
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice 
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considera-
tions.‖289 
These two different means of combating the problem of faction 
were not at all inconsistent, but rather reflect a subtle and sophisticated 
understanding of psychology and political theory on the part of Madi-
son. Recognizing that politicians can, at various times and under various 
circumstances, act out of narrow self-interest or unselfish concern for 
the public good, Madison sought to create a system which he hoped 
 
 286 RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 49–57; Strahan, supra note 18, 75–84. 
 287 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
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would reduce incentives for the former and multiply instances of the lat-
ter.290 
In considering the extent to which Madison expected the Constitu-
tion to restrain and direct the actions of the legislature, we should con-
sider its effects on the legislators he hoped for, those of ―enlightened 
views and virtuous sentiments,‖ not the factional rabble rousers he 
feared. One of the most important values Madison hoped for in a legis-
lator was impartiality. As Gordon Wood explains, ―[Madison] hoped 
against hope that the new, elevated federal government might assume a 
judicial-like character and become a disinterested and dispassionate 
umpire in disputes between different interests within the individual 
states.‖291 
That Madison sought ―judicial-like‖ virtues in his ideal legislators 
is not surprising given that he viewed the art of governing itself as a 
large, complex, and never-ending adjudication of the aggregate claims 
of innumerable groups and interests within the polity. While we can 
find this point made in Madison‘s private writings,292 he makes it most 
clearly and powerfully in Federalist No. 10: 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his inter-
est would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt 
his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are 
unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are 
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial 
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, 
but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are 
the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the 
causes which they determine?293 
Such impartial, judicious, and public-minded legislators would 
nonetheless be, and feel themselves to be, bound by the Constitution. In 
the first place, the people themselves ratified the Constitution, in their 
various state conventions, and we have seen that for Madison, the 
people themselves were the ultimate source of constitutional authority. 
Legislators who adhered to the constitutional plan were following the 
will of the people, but in a manner that was ―more consonant to the pub-
lic good‖ than that of politicians who appealed to the baser instincts of 
the public. Madison expected Congress to stay within the powers 
granted by the Constitution to the federal government, which, he noted, 
 
 290 Robertson, supra note 24, at 200–01 (―Madison in effect proposed to reconstitute the na-
tional government so that the national policy-makers‘ ambitions would be driven by a material 
concern for national advantage.‖); Strahan, supra note 18, at 63. 
 291 Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 792 (quoting Letter from James Madi-
son to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 292 See Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 346; Wood, Judicial Review Revi-
sited, supra note 12, at 809. 
 293 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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were ―few and defined,‖ yet he also argued that in any contest for the 
people‘s loyalty, it was the states who were far more likely to encroach 
on federal prerogatives than the opposite. Popular preference for the 
federal government could only be won by ―manifest and proofs of a bet-
ter administration‖ and such superior administration was possible, Mad-
ison asserted, ―only within a certain sphere.‖294 
Able and conscientious legislators, therefore, would seek to stay 
within their designated constitutional role even without any external 
constraint. They would do so because (1) it was their democratic duty, 
as representatives of the people, to carry out the people‘s will as ex-
pressed in the Constitution; (2) as prudential legislators, they would 
recognize that the national government can only effectively administer 
within a limited sphere; and (3) the Constitution would itself ―acquire 
by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Govern-
ment.‖295 
With respect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Madison consis-
tently described the grant of federal power there as an obvious instance 
where federal lawmaking would be superior to that of the states. This 
was because the states had already proven themselves inadequate to the 
task by ―trespassing‖ on each other‘s rights and because the national in-
terest was so clearly in favor of promotion of interstate harmony by re-
quiring state deference to other state‘s laws and judicial proceedings, in 
a neutral and disinterested manner. Madison‘s few public statements 
concerning the constitutional grant of such power to Congress shows 
that he viewed Congress‘s superior ability to act in this area to be ob-
vious and indisputable.296 Note, however, that Madison‘s presumption 
of the superiority of federal lawmaking in this area is premised on his 
assumption that such lawmaking will be directed toward a particular 
 
 294 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
 295 James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 269, 273 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1904). Madison made this point as 
one of the primary arguments in favor of a bill of rights. Madison seriously waffled on the ques-
tion whether a bill of rights would be necessary or beneficial. He opposed it in the Federalist as 
unneeded. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Mad-
ison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); see 
also LABUNSKI, supra note 31, at 62. But Madison later changed his mind for what appear to be 
primarily prudential political reasons. See id. at 62–63, 159. 
  In the above letter, however, Madison tells Jefferson, he ―has always been in favor of a bill 
of rights‖ as something that ―might be of use‖ but had not ―viewed it in an important light.‖ Mad-
ison, Letter to Jefferson, supra note 119, at 271. Although Madison expressed doubts, based on 
historical experience, that a bill of rights could protect effectively against ―overbearing majori-
ties‖ or, on occasion, by ―a succession of artful and ambitious rulers.‖ Id. at 273. Nonetheless, 
many of Madison‘s arguments both for and against the bill of rights assume that the Constitution-
al constraints it contains will be followed most of the time by conscientious lawmakers. That is 
why he is so concerned that prohibitions on federal lawmaking not be enumerated in such a way 
as to give the federal government either too much power or too little. 
 296 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); 3 Elliot, supra note 196, at 584–85 (―Statement 
during Debates on Virginia‘s Ratification of the Constitution‖). 
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and obviously beneficial purpose: promotion of interstate harmony and 
economic stability through deference by states to each other‘s laws and 
judicial proceedings. 
We have seen that Madison preferred Morris‘s vague yet potential-
ly expandable version of the first sentence of the Clause to Randolph‘s 
clearer, more detailed, but static rule that included substantive defe-
rence, because Madison ―wished the Legislature might be authorized to 
provide for the execution of Judgments in other States, under such regu-
lations as might be expedient‖ and believed this was ―justified by the 
nature of the Union.‖297 The call that any subsequent exercise of legisla-
tive power be ―authorized‖ by the Constitution again demonstrates 
Madison‘s assumption that the Congress, even if not subject to judicial 
review, would operate under constitutional constraints. 
What were those constitutional constraints that limited Congres-
sional power to make laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause? The 
first, and perhaps most interesting, is the one Madison expressly ap-
pealed to at the Convention, the ―nature of the [federal] union.‖298 It was 
on this ground that Madison believed a law providing for interstate ex-
ecution of judgments was ―justified.‖299 For Madison, then, the nature 
of the Union itself provided some constraint on the kind of actions Con-
gress could legitimately take. Increased obligations of interstate defe-
rence were consistent with the new ―more perfect‖ union300 that the 
framers were creating. If the nature of the federal union could provide 
justification for legislative actions that created stronger interstate defe-
rence obligations, the nature of the union could also provide a powerful 
argument against any legislative actions that would weaken existing in-
terstate deference obligations. In this way the full faith and credit obli-
gation was tied, for Madison, to a fundamental constitutional prin-
ciple—that the Constitution had created an indissoluble federal union 
 
 297 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Madison‘s argument here clearly invokes reference to the Preamble to the Constitution 
(drafted by the Committee on Style of which Madison was a member). The qualitatively ―more 
perfect‖ union referred to there is universally (or at least judicially) assumed to draw comparison 
with the less perfect union that had previously existed under the Articles of Confederation. See 
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (―[W]hen these Articles were found to be in-
adequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained to form a more perfect 
Union‖) (internal quotation marks removed), overruled on other grounds by Morgan v. United 
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549–50 (1876). 
In this sense, the two unions are directly analogous to the two full faith and credit clauses of the 
Articles and Constitution respectively, with that latter being an ―evident and valuable improve-
ment‖ on the former, because it authorizes Congress to make laws clarifying and strengthening 
the deference obligations set forth in the clause. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). Laws 
that weakened or abrogated existing deference obligations would obviously not constitute such 
improvements and would not be consistent with the ―more perfect union‖ the framers were seek-
ing to create. 
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that could not be weakened or eroded by the actions of individual 
states.301 
We have seen that Madison always viewed the Full Faith and Cre-
dit Clause as an obvious and unproblematic case for the exercise of fed-
eral power.302 Randolph and other Virginians thought giving the federal 
government power to determine the effects of one state‘s law in another 
was a vast and unjustified expansion of federal power. Why did Madi-
son not view it the same way? Unlike Hamilton, he was no ardent advo-
cate of federal power who wished to see the states wither away. He was 
a disciple of Jefferson, an advocate of a strong but limited federal gov-
ernment, which he felt should take on only those ―limited powers‖ that 
could be well administered by the federal government. Promotion of in-
terstate deference was clearly such a power for Madison because (1) it 
had already been set forth as a national concern in the Articles of Con-
federation and (2) the federal government could function effectively as a 
dispassionate promoter of interstate harmony in a way the states could 
not. Madison viewed the grant of federal legislative power in the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause as a limited and uncontroversial power needed 
to promote interstate deference and harmony and thereby strengthen the 
Union. Use of that power to abrogate existing interstate deference obli-
gations would not only be unwise and shortsighted but inconsistent with 
the constitutional justifications for granting such power. 
The constitutional obligation of interstate deference came from two 
main and somewhat overlapping sources: the clause in the Articles of 
Confederation and the law of nations. There is no indication in any doc-
ument of the time that the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause was intended to empower Congress to displace or abrogate the 
interstate deference obligations that existed under the Articles‘ clause 
and continued under the first sentence of the Constitution‘s clause.303 
 
 301 See Madison, Letter to Roane, supra note 267, at 65. Madison‘s correspondence with 
Spencer Roane (Patrick Henry‘s son-in-law and a strong states rights proponent, see Rakove, 
Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1533) are the clearest statements we have of Madison‘s con-
tinued commitment to Federalist principles in the face of a rising tide of concern in southern 
states over perceived federal incursions on state sovereignty. In that letter, Madison, while sym-
pathetic to many of Roane‘s critiques of particular Supreme Court actions, strongly defends the 
federal (as opposed to the state) judiciary‘s role as ultimate arbiters of the boundaries of federal 
power. Madison, Letter to Roane, supra note 267, at 66–67. Madison argued that if individual 
states were allowed to decide such constitutional questions for themselves the degree of sove-
reignty retained ―might become different in every state‖ and that this would destroy ―the vital 
principle of equality, which cements their Union.‖ Id. at 66. It is easy to imagine Madison making 
a similar argument if presented with a proposal to allow each state to decide how much deference 
to give to other states‘ judgments. For a detailed discussion of the Roane correspondence, see 
Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1534–42. 
 302 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); 3 Elliot, supra note 196, at 584–85 
(―Statement during Debates on Virginia‘s Ratification of the Constitution‖). 
 303 The only support for such a view derives from a strained ahistorical reading of the second 
sentence of the Clause which not only puts it in conflict with the first sentence, but which I have 
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While those obligations were admittedly somewhat vague, they in-
cluded at least, most scholars agree, a prima facie rule of validity re-
garding most out-of-state judgments, and very likely a rule of substan-
tive deference regarding admiralty judgments, and perhaps other out-of-
state judgments as well.304 The ongoing disputes regarding the Articles‘ 
clause, as the more legally sophisticated of the Framers well unders-
tood, was whether the Articles‘ clause embodied only the same defe-
rence obligations that existed among independent states under the law 
of nations, or whether it strengthened and increased those obligations. 
We have seen that Madison had good reasons for wanting to give Con-
gress the power to eliminate this uncertainty by legislating stronger de-
ference obligations, but there is no indication that either Madison or his 
opponents believed they were thereby also giving Congress a right to 
abrogate the deference obligations that then existed among the states.305 
This conclusion becomes even stronger if we accept the arguments 
of Crosskey, Sherry, and others that the constitutional constraints on 
federal lawmaking envisioned by the Framers also included the funda-
mental principles of the law of nations. Such arguments are consistent 
with the concern for vested rights that pervades much of Madison‘s 
thinking and writing during this period, not only with respect to the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, but also regarding paper currency, enforcement 
of contracts, and a whole panoply of constitutional limitations and re-
strictions on debt obligations. It is hard to imagine that the man who ad-
vocated so strongly for all of those restrictions would have also advo-
cated a Clause that he believed gave the federal legislature the right to 
relieve states of their obligations to enforce the debts or other vested 
rights incurred or declared in sister states.306 Accordingly, it appears 
 
shown to be the product of a mistakenly ―legalistic‖ approach to constitutional interpretation 
which was not part of Madison‘s original intent. We have seen that in a period without substantial 
judicial review of congressional lawmaking, the second sentence looks less like a ―legal‖ grant of 
absolute discretionary power (and therefore insulated from judicial review) and more like a sim-
ple allocation of power to Congress rather than the states to carry out the purposes set forth gen-
erally in the first sentence of the Clause. 
 304 See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1584; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1224–26; Whitten, FF&C and 
DOMA, supra note 3, at 282. Whitten states that substantive deference was also applied to defen-
sive uses of foreign judgments under English law and there was at least a serious argument that 
the Articles‘ clause and the first sentence of the constitutional clause embodied a rule of substan-
tive deference for all sister state judgments. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 
534. 
 305 Randolph‘s objection to the effects clause was not that it gave Congress new or unprece-
dented powers, but that it ―usurp[ed]‖ existing state powers. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 488–89. It 
is unlikely that Randolph thought that state legislatures had the power to abrogate the deference 
obligations that existed under the Articles‘ clause or the law of nations. Accordingly, neither 
would the federal legislature. 
 306 The hardest question that can be raised with respect to this line of argument is whether 
there were some questions that were so potentially divisive among the states that Madison would 
have recognized a power to abrogate the full faith and credit obligation with respect to such is-
sues. It is worth noting that the one issue that might have caused such division, slavery, was ac-
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quite likely that to Madison, any law enacted by Congress that dimi-
nished rather than strengthened the existing interstate full faith and cre-
dit obligation would have been a violation of the Constitution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article is intended as a work of history, an inquiry into the 
way Madison‘s arguments and writing in connection with the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause fit into his broader views regarding fundamental con-
stitutional questions. It has shown that the debate about the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause at the Constitutional Convention was not primarily 
about evidentiary versus substantive rules, but between advocates of a 
substantive but static and limited rule of deference clearly set out in the 
constitutional text, and those, like Madison, who favored a more vague 
but more dynamic rule of substantive deference that could be enforced 
and strengthened by congressional enactment. It has also shown that the 
Clause was part of a broader plan by Madison and others to curb the 
ability of states to take actions that were harmful to one another and to 
the nation as a whole. Madison was particularly concerned with state 
actions that he felt interfered with vested contractual rights created or 
enforced in other states, thereby jeopardizing the country‘s economic 
well being. In this way, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was closely 
tied to other provisions seeking to prevent states from infringing vested 
rights, like the contract and bankruptcy clauses. 
Most centrally, however, this piece has been concerned with how 
Madison would have viewed the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 
apparent conflict between the first and second sentences that looms so 
large in contemporary debates about the meaning of the Clause. We 
have seen that for Madison, viewing the issue not from the perspective 
of a court engaged in judicial review, but as a legislator, seeking to act 
within constitutional limits, the conflict largely disappears. The power 
granted to Congress in the second sentence is discretionary to reflect the 
fact that Congress, as the supreme lawmaking power of the nation, not 
only cannot be forced to take action, but would also be, Madison ex-
pected, the final arbiter of its own obligations under the Constitution. 
 
tually removed from the full faith and credit obligation and made the subject of a constitutional 
rule of substantive deference beyond the power of Congress to alter. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 
cl. 3 (Fugitive Slave Clause). Even this disgraceful part of constitutional history, however, re-
flects the Founders‘ belief that it was deference to each other‘s laws that would bind the states 
together. Surely Madison would have been highly skeptical of any claim that it was necessary for 
a harmonious union that one state abrogate rights created under the laws of a sister state. In light 
of recent events like the federal government‘s suspension of ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ and refusal 
to enforce Section 3 of DOMA, it is certainly hard to imagine an argument that Section 2 of 
DOMA is necessary to preserve the Union. 
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Those obligations, however, would still include promotion of interstate 
harmony and the deference to each other‘s laws and judicial proceed-
ings set forth in the first sentence of the clause. Laws that violated such 
obligations might not be unenforceable in Madison‘s political model, 
but they would be unconstitutional. 
The interest in these issues, of course, is strongly influenced by 
current debates regarding the DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. The historical arguments made in this Article might be used to 
justify any of three rather different positions in that debate. First, one 
might argue that the Madisonian conception of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause differs so dramatically from our own—colored as it is by 200 
years of Supreme Court interpretive glosses that Madison might well 
have viewed with suspicion but that have now hardened into authorita-
tive ―law‖—that analysis of Madison‘s thought, as well as other at-
tempts to ascertain the original intent of the Framers, can provide little 
useful guidance on the contemporary legal issue of the constitutionality 
of DOMA. This is a respectable position, and one that implicates a large 
and ever-growing literature on the role of original intent in contempo-
rary Constitutional interpretation.307 I do not intend to add to it here. 
A second position would be to emphasize Madison‘s 1787 belief in 
legislative supremacy and argue that as a practical, if not a normative 
matter, Madison believed that Congress under the new Full Faith and 
Credit Clause would be free to pass any law it liked regarding the ef-
fects of out-of-state judgments without fear of any institutional interfe-
rence from the other branches of government, and that this justifies a 
reading of the second sentence of the Clause as a grant of ―plenary‖ 
power. This strikes me as a disingenuous reading of Madison‘s thought, 
focusing only on practical political concerns and not on his broader 
normative vision. Moreover, it is inaccurate even as a statement of Mad-
ison‘s political theory, because while Madison recognized that Congress 
might have the power to act without effective constraint, he did not 
hope or believe that they would do so. 
Finally, the third, and I think strongest, argument is that the core 
Madisonian conception of the Full Faith and Credit Clause required that 
states recognize and give substantial deference to the judgments and 
other official acts of sister states, particularly when they involved vested 
contract and property rights, including the contractual and property 
rights created by marriage. For Madison this obligation of sister-state 
deference was an obvious and necessary corollary to the creation of a 
federal union. While Madison acknowledged that the precise form and 
degree of that deference was somewhat uncertain, and he specifically 
sought to give the federal legislature power to define and strengthen that 
 
 307 See generally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 
2007). 
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deference obligation over time, he hoped and believed that the legisla-
tors were constrained by fundamental constitutional norms from abro-
gating existing sister-state deference obligations. Accordingly, any law, 
like DOMA, which purports to leave states free to ignore important ma-
rital and other contractual rights granted pursuant to the laws and legal 
proceedings of sister states is a violation of that original Madisonian in-
tent. 
